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RECENT DECISIONS
BANKS AND BANKING-INSOLVENT BANKS-CLAIMS FOR FUTURE RENT. 1 The
plaintiff, landlord, sued to have his claim for fifteen years future rent admitted to
share in the distribution of the assets of an insolvent state bank whose affairs were
being liquidated by the Superintendent of Banks, the latter having repudiated the
lease. A judgment in favor of the defendant entered upon a decision of the court
at Special Term2 dismissing the complaint on the merits was unanimously affirmed by
the Appellate Division 3
On appeal, held, that such claim falls outside of any
possible statutory right to share in dividends payable on claims which existed when
the Superintendent took possession. Judgment affirmed. Varick Spring Corporation
v. Bank of United States, 264 N. Y. 297, 190 N. E. 647 (1934).
As former Justice Holmes has remarked, 4 the law as to leases is not a matter of
logic in vacuo, but is rather a matter of history that has not forgotten Lord Coke's
exposition of the common law rule that future rent is not due until the rent day.5
The nature of the landlord's claim for future rent has been considered in the
federal courts in bankruptcy proceedings where the statute provides that only debts
are provable. Under this statute it has been held that a landlord has only a contingent claim for future rent and so cannot prove,7 but recent cases manifest a
tendency to devise means to admit the landlord's claims. 8 Finally, the landlord has
been given a limited statutory right to a maximum of three years future rent.9
1. The question of claims for future rent has been a prolific source of controversial
writing. Radin, Claims for Unaccrued Rent in Bankruptcy, (1932) 21 Cxa. L. Rnv. 561,
22 id 1; Schwabacher and Weinstein, Rent Claims in Bankruptcy, (1933) 33 CoL. L. Rn'.
214; Clark, Foley and Shaw, Adoption and Rejection of Contracts and Leases by Receivers
(1933) 46 HAnv. L. R.v. 1111; (1933) 33 CoL. L. Rav. 1059; Comment (1934) 34 id. 143;
id. 554 ; (1934) 47 HAny. L. REv. 488; (1934) 82 U. or PA. L. REv. 530.
2. 149 A cise.
908, 268 N. Y. Supp. 272 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
3. Memorandum opinion 240 App. Div. 968, 268 N. Y. Supp. 275 (1st Dep't 1933).
4. Gardner v. Butler & Co., 245 U. S. 603, 605 (1918). Cf. the concurrent case FilenA's
Sons Co. v. Weed, 245 U. S. 597 (1918).
S. Co. LTrT. *292b.
6. BA nxRupTC ACr § 63, 30 STAT. 544 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A., c. 7, § 103 (1925).
7. In re Roth & Appel, 181 Fed. 667 (C. C. A. 2d, 1910).
8. The bankruptcy courts have admitted that bankruptcy might work an anticipatory
breach of contract but at first excepted rent claims as std generis. Central Trust Co. v.
Chicago Auditorium, 240 U. S. 581 (1916). Cf. In re Mullins Clothing Co., 238 Fed. 58
(C. C. A. 2d, 1916) cert. denied, 243 U. S. 635 (1917). The Supreme Court has apparently
reversed this view and has recently held by way of dictum that there may be some color to
the argument that bankruptcy is an anticipatory breach of the lease contract entailing a
damage claim against the estate. See Manhattan Properties, Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 291
U. S. 320, 338 (1934). 3 W3LsToxN, CoueraAcrs (1920) §§ 1328-1329.
Besides this, the argument that the court bars rent claims because they are contingent
has been weakened by the admission to proof of the contingent claim of a holder of a
note against the bankrupt estate of an endorser, prior to maturity and dishonor of the
note. Maynard v. Elliot, 283 U. S. 273 (1931).
9. BA zuPT Y Acr § 63, 30 STAT. 544 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A., c. 7, § 103 (1926) as
amended by P. L. No. 296, June 7, 1934 and P. L. No. 387, June 18, 1934, 73rd Congress;
id., c. 8, § 77B (1934).
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With regard to insolvent state banks,10 the New York Banking Law is broader than
the bankruptcy statute and provides that creditors must prove claims.11 The cases
under this law have held, however, that only such claims will be admitted as existed
at the time the Superintendent 12 took over the bank's affairs.' 8 The claim for rent
is created when the lease is made,14 so that although New York follows the common
law rule and regards future rent as a contingent claim,' 8 it would seem logical that
the landlord's claim for future rent'0 is an existing claim at the time the Superintendent takes over the bank.17 In the instant case, the court was apparently of the
10. The trial court sought to distinguish the principal case from People v. St. Nicholas
Bank, 151 N. Y. 592, 45 N. E. 1129 (1897) on the ground that in that case the dissolution
of a bank was involved, while the instant case deals with the liquidation of a bank. The
N. Y. Banking Law makes no such distinction in defining the rights of creditors, and since
a bank cannot reopen unless it meets with the provisions of N. Y. Banking Law (1909) § 61
as amended by Laws of 1932, c. 399, § 2, L. 1933, c. 21, the liquidation of an Insolvent
bank is equivalent to its dissolution, as far as creditors' remedies are concerned. "Liquidation is synonymous with winding up or settlement with creditors." Lafayette Trust Co. v.
Beggs, 213 N. Y. 280, 283, 107 N. E. 644, 645 (1915).
11. N. Y. Banking Law (1909) § 72, as amended by Laws of 1930, c. 664, § 4, L. 1931,
c. 310, § 1, L. 1932 c. 399, § 2, L. 1934, c. 257. The term "claim" is broader than debt.
Jamison v. Blowers, 5 Barb. 686 (N. Y. 1849); Schwabacher and Weinstein, supra, note 1,
at 216.
12. The State Superintendent of Banks, who has the statutory duty to take over and
liquidate the affairs of an insolvent bank is an arm of the administrative branch of the
state government appointed by the Governor by and with the advice of the Senate. N. Y.
B
o LAw (1909) § 10, as amended by Laws of 1927, c. 178, § 1, Laws of 1932, c,
399, § 2. In this respect he differs from a receiver appointed by the court; but, subject
to the provisions of statute, when he takes over the affairs of a bank he becomes an arm
of the court. Matter of Union Bank, 176 App. Div. 477, 163 N. Y. Supp. 485 (2d Dep't
1917).
13. Matter of State Bank of Canastota, 238 App. Div. 39, 263 N. Y. Supp. 388 (3d
Dep't 1933), aff'd, 263 N. Y. 571, 189 N. E. 702 (1933); People v. Metropolitan Surety Co.,
205 N. Y. 135, 98 N. E. 412 (1912) (admitting that it is a harsh rule but that it is deemed
best for public policy); Matter of People (Norske Lloyd Ins. Co.), 249 N. Y, 139, 163 N.
E. 129 (1928). Cf. the rule in equitable proceedings, Filene's Sons Company v. Weed, 245
U. S.597, 602 (1918)'; Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. N. Y. City Ry. Co., 198 Fed. 721, 740 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1912); MacPherson v. Evart State Bank, 239 Mich. 670, 674, 214 N. W. 971, 972
(1927). New York apparently formerly applied the equitable rule to insolvent state bank
proceedings. See People v. St. Nicholas Bank, 151 N. Y. 592, 597, 45 N. E. 1129, 1130
(1897).
14. Bordman v. Osborne, 40 Mass. 295 (1839); see People v. St. Nicholas Bank, 3 App.
Div. 544, 552, 38 N. Y. Supp. 379, 384 (1st Dep't 1896).
15. Stafford Security Co. Inc. v. Kremer, 258 N. Y. 1, 90 N. Et 1140 (1931).
16. If the landlord does not terminate the lease and is able to re-let the premises his
claim for any deficiency thereby entailed is a claim for rent. See Kottler v. N. Y. Bargain
House, 242 N. Y. 28, 34, 35, 150 N. E. 591, 592 (1926). It is true that People v. St,
Nicholas Bank 151 N. Y. 592, 45 N. E. 1129 (1897) involved a claim for such a deficiency
but the result in the instant case is not based on this distinction.
17. A landlord might also have a claim for damages upon breach of covenant to pay
rent, which is a contingent claim, Hermitage v. Levine, 248 N. Y. 333, 162 N. E. 97 (1928).
By analogy to the situation in bankruptcy it seems logical that the entry of the Superintendent could be treated by the landlord as an anticipatory breach and that he could at
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opinion that such a claim was so contingent, uncertain, and remote, that it fell
outside of any possible statutory right to share in dividends ordered to be paid on
claims existing when the Superintendent of Banks took possession. Since in so
holding the court reached a result directly opposed to that reached in the leading
case of People v. St. Nicholas Bank' s and since other jurisdictions are in conflict' 0

it is of interest to examine the basis of the court's decision. The court based its
conclusion on Justice Cardozo's dictum in Kottler v. New York Bargain Hozusco to
the effect that claims, either for future rent or for damages, could not share in
assets held by an assignee for the benefit of creditors; but such a situation differs
from and is governed by other statutes than that of an insolvent bank, 2 ' and it is
significant that Justice Cardozo cited People v. St. Nicholas Bank with approval.
In any event this dictum did not assume that the landlord does not have a claim,
which is all that is required by the New York Banking Law.' 2 Again, the instant
case professed to adopt the Massachusetts rule that such claims fall outside of the
statutory right to share in the distribution of assets of an insolvent bank, but a
study of the two Massachusetts cases cited does not disclose any satisfactory basis
for the formulation of such a rule.P The plaintiff, moreover, advanced the novel
once claim for damages, see note 8, supra. If he does not do so it is settled that the
liability of the bank continues after the Superintendent takes over the bank's affairs.
People v. National Trust Co. 82 N. Y. 283 (1880); People v. Globe Mutual Life In-. Co.,
91 N. Y. 174 (1883); People v. St. Nicholas Bank, 151 N. Y. 592, 45 N. E. 1129 (1897).
If the Superintendent repudiates the lease after his entry it seems by analogy to the
equitable rule the better view that such repudiation relates back to the time of his entry.
Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. N. Y. City Ry. Co. 198 Fed. 721 (C. C. A. 2d, 1912); WeAtingrhouse E. & M. Co. v. Brooklyn Rapid Transit Co., 6 F. (2d) 547 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925);
Clark, Foley and Shaw, note 1, supra. The claim for damages it is submitted therefore, like
the claim for rent, can be regarded as existing at the time of the entry of the Superintendent irrespective of the date of his repudiation.
18. 151 N. Y. 592, 45 N. E. 1129 (1897).
19. In McGraw v. Union Trust Co., 135 MIch. 609, 98 N. W. 390 (1904) following what
the court understood as the New York rule and the weight of authority, such a claim
was allowed, under a statute similar to the New York Banking Law. Contra: Pacific
States Corp. v. Rosenshine, 113 Cal. App. 266, 298 Pac. 155 (1931) disallowing a claim
for damages for breach of covenant of insolvent bank to pay rent.
20. 242 N. Y. 28, 150 N. E. 591 (1926).
21. The effect of this dictum apparently is that since the claim either for rent or for
damages is not a debt the assignee for benefit of creditors cannot admit the claim under the
N. Y. DEBroR aND CREorOR LAW (1909) § 13 (c). Matter of Louis Friedman & Bro., Inc.,
150 M sc. 209, 269 N. Y. Supp. 177 (Sup. Ct. 1933). Both this case and People v. St.
Nicholas Bank, 151 N. Y. 592, 45 N. E. 1129 (1897) are careful to distinguish the difference
between the landlord's claim against an insolvent bank as contrasted to his right against
an assignee for benefit of creditors. Cf. Aatter of Havenor 144 N. Y. 271, 39 N. E. 393
(1895). But see Kottler v. N. Y. Bargain House, 242 N. Y. 28, 35, 150 N. E. 591, 593
(1926).
22. See note 11, supra.
23. Deane v. Caldwell, 127 Mlass. 242 (1879); Towle v. Commissioner of Banks, 246
Mass. 161, 140 N. E. 747 (1923). Deane v. Caldwell, supra, involved a claim for future
rent against the administrator of an insolvent's estate and contained dicta to the effect that
such a claim was not a debt and so could not share in the assets. However, the facts
were that the administrator surrendered the lease and the lessors accepted the premises and
terminated the lease without reserving the right to claim for future rent. Furthermore,
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argument that the Superintendent of Banks is directed by statute to collect the

fund 24 created by the constitutional 25 and statutory26 liability of stockholders to
satisfy the bank's debts and liabilities of every kind, and that since this fund is to
be distributed to those who prove their claims the plaintiff, who is entitled to
look to this fund for security,27 should be entitled to have his claim admitted in
order to share in the distribution of the fund.28 The court advanced no argument
in rebuttal. It is submitted that in construing the word claim as used in the New
York Banking Law the court was straining to reach a conclusion more in accord
with contemporary social expediency than with precedent 20 By preserving the
assets for distribution to depositors rather than admitting the landlord to share, the
burden was in some measure shifted to shoulders more able to recoup the ultimate
loss. However, the case emphasizes the need for a more complete legislative
definition of claims admissible to share in the assets of an insolvent bank; and
possibly, with regard to claims for future rent, for provision for payment of a
limited amount similar to the recent federal legislation in bankruptcy.
the court allowed rent that accrued after the death and up to the time of the urrender.
In Towle v. Commissioner, supra, the court on appeal was bound by the Judgment of
the lower court to which neither side took exception that, "no action or contingent debt
payable presently or in the future was due or certainly to become due to the plaintiff as
lessor on account of the covenants of the lease when the Commissioner took possession of
the property of the lessee." The court, therefore, concluded that it was impossible for the
claim, "to be proved within the time limited for proof of claims," and so could not be
admitted to share in the assets.
24. N. Y. BANxx LAW (1909) § 80, amended by Laws of 1934, c. 494.
25. N. Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 7 defines the liability as one for all of a bank's "debts
and liabilities of every kind."
26. N. Y. BANIrN LAW (1909) § 120 defines the liability as one for "all contracts, debts,
or engagements of the bank." This liability is not limited to debts only. Turner v. First
National Bank of Keokuk, 26 Iowa 262 (1869) (which went so far as to Include a tort
claim); Commissioner of Banks v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co., 247 Mass. 334, 142 N. E. 100
(1924).
27. The stockholders' liability attaches to contracts of the bank and parties contract on
this basis. See Richmond v. Irons, 121 U. S. 27, 55, 56 (1887); Witters v. Sowles, 32 Fed.
130, 137 (C. C. D. 1887) ; Corning v. McCullough, 1 N. Y. 47, 55, 56, 59 (1847).
The capital stock of a corporation is a trust fund for the security of creditors and the
amount recovered from the stockholders in addition ta the capital stock may be treated as
a like security. Marshall v. Sherman, 148 N. Y. 9, 42 N. E. 419 (1895); Hirschfeld v.
Fitzgerald, 157 N. Y. 166, 51 N. E. 997 (1898).
28. N. Y. BANinG LAW (1909) § 78, amended by Laws of 1930, c. 678, § 17, Laws of
1932, c. 399, § 2, provides for payment of dividends to such persons and in such amounts
as the court may direct, but only those whose claims are filed and accepted are entitled to
share in dividends. Id. § 76 as amended by Laws of 1930, c. 678, § 17, Laws of 1931, C.310,
§ 2, Laws of 1932, c. 399, § 2.
29. The leading case setting forth the equitable rules under which contingent claims
are admitted to share in the distribution of insolvent estates is Pennsylvania Steel Co.
v. N. Y. City Ry. Co., 198 Fed. 721 (C. C. A. 2d, 1912). For an example of an attempt to
evaluate a claim for future rent, see Curran v. Smith-Zollinger Co., 157 At. 432 (Del. Ch.
1931) ; 3 WnLms-'oN, CoNRAcrs (1920) §§ 1328-1329. Cf. Leo v. Pierce Stores Co., 57 F.
(2d) 340 (E. D. Mich. 1932).
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BILLS AND NOTES--FITrrIous PAYEE-LABILrrY OF INNOCENT DRANvE-The
plaintiff claimed to be a holder in due course of a check made by the defendant to
the order of "Tri Rite Dresses." The check was cashed by the plaintiff for one
Harry Goodman whose signature appears on the check as indorsee below the alleged
indorsement of "Tri Rite Dresses." Fifteen such checks similarly indorsed had been
cashed by the plaintiff over a period of six months and paid by the defendant. It
was subsequently discovered that the checks had been procured by the fraud of
an employee of the defendant in representing that they were in payment of
merchandise. In an action on the check plaintiff recovered judgment. On appeal,
held, that the drawer is not liable upon a check made payable to a fictitious person
whom he in good faith believed to be existent. Judgment reversed, and complaint
dismissed. Two judges dissented. Jacoby v. Kli~w Bros., Inc., 241 App. Div. 470,
272 N. Y. Supp. S71 (1st Dep't 1934).
That fact-finding is a difficult and important part of the judicial process is aptly
instanced herein where the court agreed upon the principle of law but divided upon
the pertinent facts.' The majority opinion assumed that there was no such firm as
Tri Rite Dresses, and that the maker was induced to execute the check by the
fraud of his employee, in the belief that there was such a firm in existence to which
he was indebted. The dissenting opinion assumed that the payee in fact was
Goodman who really existed and was using the name Tri Rite Dresses. The two
opinions agree that the case is not governed by the Negotiable Instruments Law,
Section 9, subdivision 3.2 This section has been applied in two types of cases:
those in which the payee was non-existent to the knowledge of the maker, 3 and thoze
in which the payee though existing in fact, was not intended by the maker to have
any interest in the instrument or in the proceeds thereof. 4 On the basis of its
assumption that the payee was fictitious, the majority reaches a sound conclusion.
The case does not fall within the statute because it is conceded that the defendant
was ignorant of the non-existence of the payee, and where the payee is in fact
fictitious, but the maker draws the check in the honest belief that such person does
exist, the instrument is not deemed payable to bearer.3 It has been pointed out
1. This thought is well expressed by Justice Cardozo: 'Wore and more we lawyers are
awakening to a perception of the truth that what divides and distracts us in the solution
of a legal problem is not so much uncertainty about the law as uncertainty about the
74. See also, Kennedy,
facts--the facts which generate the law.' LAv .,m Lrrmruaut
Principkes or Facts? (1935) 4 Fomm= L. REv. 53.
.2. "The instrument is payable to bearer when it is payable to the order of a fictitious
or non-existing person, and such fact was known to the person making it so payable."
3. P. & G. Card & Paper Co., Inc. v. Fifth Nat. Bank, 172 N. Y. Supp. 688 (Sup. Ct.
App. Term 1918).
4. Phillips v. Mercantile Nat. Bank, 140 N. Y. 556, 35 N. E. 982 (1894); Snyder v.
Corn Exch. Nat. Bank, 221 Pa. 599, 70 Ati. 876 (1908).
5. Shipman v. Bank of State of N. Y., 126 N. Y. 318, 27 N. E. 371 (1891); Armstrong
v. Pomeroy Nat. Bank, 46 Ohio St. 512, 22 N. E. 866 (1889). This last case has been
distinguished in Jones v. People's Bank Co., 95 Ohio St. 253, 116 N. E. 35 (1917), and in
Norton v. City Bank & Trust Co., 294 Fed. 839 (C. C. A. 4th, 1923). The section in the
English BILL or ExcNAxGn Acr 45 & 46 Vicr. c. 61, § 7 (3)

(1882) corresponding to N. Y.

N. I. L. § 28 (3), does not require knowledge in the maker. An interesting question arises
where the instrument is actually made out by an employee of the drawer with knowledge
that the payee is fictitious and the drawer in good faith merely affixes his signature. It
has been held that the drawer's intention controls and that § 28 (3) does not apply.
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that Section 9, subdivision 3 is also held to govern cases in which the payee though
existing to the knowledge of the maker, was not intended by the maker to have any
interest in the instrument or in the proceeds thereof.0 This interpretation is not in
point, on the assumption of the dissent that the payee did exist. In the first place
such intention must be in the maker,' and that is clearly lacking in the facts.
Furthermore, defendant's employee did intend that the payee, his fellow conspirator,
should receive the proceeds of the check. The dissent suggests that equitably the
defendant whose negligence permitted the fraudulent scheme to be continued in
operation should be made to shoulder the resultant loss. The doctrine of estopping
an innocent but negligent drawer has been applied in actions between depositor and
depository. 8 But on the assumption made by the dissenting opinion that Tr Rite
Dresses was an existing firm and that the inference is clear Tri Rite was a trade
name used by Goodman, and that defendant was deceived as to its indebtedness
to the payee rather than as to his identity, the conclusion reached is sound legally
without recourse to the doctrine of estoppel. Since it has been held that an instrument payable to a name under which one person, or several persons were doing
business is not payable to a fictitious payee, 9 this assumption of fact takes the case
completely out of Section 9, subdivision 3. Title passed to the plaintiff by the
genuine indorsement of the payee 10 and, since he was a holder in due course, the
defense of fraudulent inducement was cut off.11 The conclusion reached by the
dissent is then inevitable.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-SuIT AGMNST A STATE-IMMUNITY.-An action was
brought by the Principality of Monaco against the state of Mississippi in the
Supreme Court of the United States, on bond issues long since due and defaulted
upon by the state. The bonds came into the possession of the Principality by gift
absolute from donors who were fully apprised of their own inability to establish a
cause of action upon them. The state of Mississippi interposed several defenses
but stressed chiefly the immunity of a sovereign from suit without its consent. Hold,
that the suit could not be maintained since a state cannot be sued without its consent. Principality of Monaco v. State of Mississippi, 292 U. S.313 (1934).
Perhaps one of the oldest doctrines known to the law is the doctrine that "The
King Can Do No Wrong." Its origin is probably traceable to man's primitive days
and evolved from the fear of the mighty and the individual's recognition of the
City of N. Y. v. Bronx County Trust Co., 261 N. Y. 64, 184 N. E.495 (1933), reargument
denied, 261 N. Y. 622, 185 N. E. 765 (1933).
6. Phillips v. Mercantile Nat. Bank, 140 N. Y. 556, 35 N. E. 982 (1894); Snyder v.
Corn Exch. Nat. Bank, 221 Pa. 599, 70 At. 876 (1908).

7. Shipman v. Bank of State of N. Y., 126 N. Y. 318, 27 N. E. 371 (1891).
8. Fletcher American Nat. Bank v. Crescent Paper Co., 193 Ind. 329, 139 N. B. 664
(1923); City of Indianapolis v. National City Bank, 80 Ind. App. 677, 138 N. E. 791
(1923); North British & Mercantile Insurance Co. v. Merchants Nat. Bank, 161 App.
Div. 341, 146 N. Y.Supp. 720 (1st Dep't 1914) which held that the drawer's negligence was
a question for the jury. Two judges dissented on the ground that the bank was not
liable in the case of checks payable to the actual persons and indorsed by them and was
liable regardless of negligence in the case of checks payable to fictitious payees.
9. Write Away Pen Co. v. Buckner, 188 Mo. App. 259, 175 S. W. 81 (1915); Hill v.
McCrow, 88 Ore. 299, 170 Pac. 306 (1918).
10.
11.

TS LAW, § 30.
NMOTABLE INSTRUIr
NEcoTmLE INsTRummrs LAW, § 57.
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need of that very might for protection.' England borrowed this concept from the
Roman system,2 and assimilated it into its own jurisprudence.3 Down through the
path of centuries this doctrine persisted, though it suffered several checks. 4 Today
however, England retains the concept in its most practical aspect: the Crown
cannot be sued without its consent.5
The United States followed the example of England, and incorporated this doctrine
into its own jurisprudence. However, in accordance with the modern trend to
contract this concept rather than expand it, this immunity from suit is limited to
the sovereignty of the United States, and to the sovereignty of the several states.
The immunity is not extended to municipal corporations, though they too are
theoretically sovereigns. In view of the persistence of this doctrine, and its recognized
position in the body of common law, the decision in the present case is clearly
justified.
In the United States, the question first arose in the case of Chisholin v. Georgia.o
That decision granting jurisdiction to the United States Supreme Court to entertain
a suit brought by a citizen of one state against another state, resulted in the immediate adoption of the Eleventh Amendment7 to the Constitution.
However, still not convinced of the immunity of states from suit, litigants sought
various avenues of attack. In Hans v. Lotdsiana s the court, supported by the arguments of Madison and Marshall in the Virginia Convention, and Alexander Hamilton
in "The Federalist," 9 held that a citizen could not sue his own state without the
i. BARRY, THE KING CAN Do No WRONG (1931) 2.
HImTORY or ENGrzH LAW (3d ed. 1927), Introd. 5.
2. 2 HoLDswoRa,
3. 1 HALSBURY, LAws Or ENGLAND (2d ed. 1931) 25.
4. Perhaps the first great check was the signing of the Great Charter at Runnymede,
June 15, 1215. 1 TAYLOp, Oasorrr AND GRowTm or ENGLISH CONsrnrumo'; (1889) 380. An
additional check was the Parliament of Simon de Montfort in 1265 (id. at 417). Further
checks were made in the Confirmatio Contarum in' 1297 (id. at 422). And the resolutions
of the Rump Parliament, January 4, 1649: "The people are, under God, the original of all
just power." (2 id. at 339).
5. Canterbury v. Regina, 12 L. J. 281 (Ch. 1843); Tobin v. Regina, 33 L. J. 199 (C.
P. 1864), 143 Eng. Reprints 1148, 16 C. B. (N. S.) 310.
6. 2 U. S. 419 (1793). This court based its decision, allowing jurisdiction in a case involving a citizen of one state as defendant, on a literal interpretation of the Constitution.
The strong dissent of Mr. Justice Iredell in that case is based on the inherent immunity of
a sovereign from suit without its consent. The tremendous public opinion evoked against
this decision was caused by the fear that it opened the door to the collection of defaulted
debts, which would terminate in bankrupcty for the several states.
7. "The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or in equity commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States, by citizens
of another state or by citizens of any foreign state.'
S. 134 U. S. 1 (1889). This decision is based on an interpretation of the spirit of the
Constitution. The ultimate aim was to secure and protect the qualities of state sovereignty,
and this purpose would never be attained were the court to entertain suits which were not
in contemplation at the time of the making of the Constitution, and which, had the proposition been made at the time, would not have been entertained. Duhne v. New Jersey, 251
U. S. 311 (1920) holding that the second clause of Art. IlM,§ 2 of the U. S. CoNsT. merely
distributed the jurisdiction conferred in the first clause into original and appellate jurisdiction, and did not profess to confer any further jurisdiction.
9. No. 81.
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consent of that state. Inasmuch as one state may sue another state, the United
States Supreme Court taking original jurisdiction in such instances, the Court has
often been confronted with the problem of whether to assume jurisdiction in order
to protect the immunity of the different states. This situation arises when cases
are brought under a provisional statute permitting the transfer of defaulted bonds
to a state for the purpose of suit. In these cases the Court refuses to defeat the
state immunity by entertaining jurisdiction, when the transaction is so colored. 10
In one instance," the Court did assume jurisdiction, but in so doing distinguished
the cases and thereby avoided overruling precedent.
All through these cases runs the theme of "The King Can Do No Wrong."12 The
motif has sustained the test of centuries, and though the counterpoint of litigating
suppliants has continued, it is now definitely settled that the doctrine, in its qualified
form, is firmly embedded in the body of American law. The instant case may be
said to be a final adjudication upon this subject. The key to the jurisdiction lies
in the status of the defendant. No matter who the plaintiff may be, no matter to
what extent damaged, he is cut off from relief by Art. III, Section 2,13 and the
Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution unless the sovereign, in its graciousness,
consents to be sued.

CONTRACTS-VALIDITY-INDUCEMENT

TO BREACH PRIOR

CONTRACT WITU

THUM

PARTY.-The plaintiff entered into a three-year contract with the Daily Racing
Form to work as a handicapper of race-horses. The defendant, with knowledge of
this contract, offered to employ the plaintiff in a similar capacity for the remainder
of the contract period, and to indemnify him if the Racing Form should sue him
for the breach. The plaintiff accepted this offer. After thirteen months' service
he was discharged by the defendant. At the close of the plaintiff's case the Trial
Term dismissed the complaint upon the ground that, since the contract had resulted
from the inducement to breach another contract, it was void. On appeal, held, two
justices dissenting, that the complaint stated a cause of action. New trial ordered.
Budd v. Morning Telegraph, 241 App. Div. 142, 271 N. Y. Supp. 538 (1st Dep't
1934), aff'd by Court of Appeals, N. Y. L. J., Nov. 21, 1934, at 1926.

Ever interesting is the problem, frequently receiving judicial attention through
the medium of the decided cases, of the validity and the enforceable character of
10. New Hampshire v. Louisiana, New York v. Louisiana, 108 U. S. 76 (1883).

No

such colorable transfer would be permitted since an assignee had no better rights than the
assignor.
11. South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U. S. 286 (1904). Here a citizen made a gift
absolute to a state under a provisional statute. A good cause of action was found and the
case was distinguished from New Hampshire v. Louisiana, New York v. Louisiana, 108 U.
S. 76 (1883), on the grounds that the assignment in that case was made for the express
purpose of suing, and that the real party in interest was the citizen; whereas In South
Dakota v. North Carolina, supra, the transfer of the bonds was a gift absolute under a pro.
visional statute passed a short time before there was any apparent intent to make a gift.
There was a strong dissent in this case.
12. 1 HAmsBURY, LAWS Or ENGLAND (2d ed. 1931) 25.
13. "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases in Law and Equity, arising under

this Constitution; the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made under their authority .

..

between a State and Citizens of another State ...

tween a State or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects."

and be-

RECENT DECISIONS
an agreement founded upon an unlawful consideration. When this illegality is
analyzed and divided into its various ramifications, the discussion takes on an added
fascination, due to the careful scrutiny to which the acts constituting the consideration must be subjected to determine their conformity or their lack thereof with
law and public policy as understood by the courts. Yet, although the judges may
differ on the disposition of a concrete case, the general principle is well established
that a contract is illegal when either in its inception or in its performance it is
1
criminal, tortious, or in aiy other manner opposed to public policy, and that the
courts will refuse to aid a plaintiff who founds his cause of action upon such an
agreement. 2 It is obvious that nothing criminal or tortious was required of the
plaintiff by the contract in the principal case, but, in order to perform, it was
necessary that he breach his contract with the Racing Form. The majority opinion
seems to be grounded upon the premise that the plaintiff did no "wrong" in breaching
this contract, the inference being that he had a "right" so to do. .That there is no
"right" to breach a contract has been ably demonstrated by the late Professor
Barbour. 3 He points out that the parties contract for performance, not for performance or damages, the payment of damages being occasioned by the liability
resulting from the exercise of the "power" to breach. His conclusion is that a
breach of contract is a wrong. 4 Manifestly it is opposed to public policy to enforce
a contract by means of which a wrong is perpetrated, 5 and authority exists for the
proposition that where a contract, to the knowledge of both parties, necessitates the
breach of an existing contract with a third party,0 it is violative of public policy
8
7
and unenforceable, whether there was an inducement to breach, or not. The
this
rule
of
the
inhibition
it
within
bring
facts of the principal case, it is submitted,
of public policy. It might be urged, however, that since the defendant was privy
to the illegality, because of its knowledge of the prior contract, its guilt should
1. 3 WLTs..ToN, CoNTRAcrs (1920) § 1628; RESTATEssET r, Co.rRAMCrS (1932) § 512.
2. Atwood v. Fiske, 101 Mlass. 363 (1S69); see 3 WmLLiasoi, CowrAcrs (1920) § 1630.
3. Barbour, The "Right" to Break a Contract (1917) 16 Micir. L. Rnv. 105. The
author assigns as a reason for the theory that there is a right to breach a contract the
fact that the niedimval lawyers stressed remedies to the exclusion of rights. Since the
remedy for breach of contract was an action for damages, they reasoned to the existence
of an alternative of performance or payment of damages, comp!etely ignoring the fact
that in the early stages of the common law specific enforcement of contracts was general.
4. But see Holmes, The Path of the Law (1S97) 10 Hnv. L. Rnv. 457, 462.
5. Reiner v. North American Newspaper Alliance, 259 N. Y. 250, 181 N. E. 561, 83
A. L. R. 23 (1932). Although in the Reiner Case the parties were not in pari ddicto, it is
submitted that its principle should have been extended to the principal case. For discussions of the Reiner Case, see Comment (1932) 18 Coan. L. Q. 84; (1932) 32 COL. L.
Rv. 1236; (1932) 46 HARv. L. Rzv. 158.
6. It is to be borne in mind that there must be a causal connection between the
contract sought to be enforced and the breach of the first contract. See Comment (1921)
21 COL. L. Rxv. 75.
7. Hocking Valley Ry. Co. v. Barbour, 190 App. Div. 341, 179 N. Y. Supp. S10 (1st
Dep't 1920) (plaintiff breached contract with third party); Rhoades v. falta Vita Pure
Food Co., 149 lich. 235, 112 N. W. 940 (1907) (plaintiff breached contract with third
party); Wanderers' Hockey Club v. Johnson, 25 Western L. R. 434 (Brit. Col. 1913); ree
Comment (1914) 27 HARv. L. Rv. 273; Comment (1921) 21 COL. L. R-v. 75. But see
(1934) 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 341.
8. Roberts v. Criss, 266 Fed. 296 (C. C. A. 2d 1920) (performance by defendant would
be breach of contract with third party).
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preclude it from asserting as a defense the illegality of the plaintiff's position. gut
the objection is without merit, as the purpose of the courts in refusing the enforcement of an illegal contract the parties to which are in pari delicto is not to protect
the defendant, but rather to confer a disability upon the plaintiff.0

COURTS-RETROSPECTVE EFFECT OF AN OVERRULING DEciSION.-The relator, in
reliance upon a decision of the United States Supreme Court holding that a state

may not tax incomes from patents,' listed in his income tax returns royalties derived
from the use of copyrights as non-taxable income, without objection by the state.

Four years later the Supreme Court expressly reversed itself,2 whereupon the state
commissioner assessed the relator's royalties received during the intermediate period.
The relator paid the tax under protest and brought certiorari proceedings to review
the determination of the state tax commissioner. Held, that the determination be confirmed. People ex rel. Rice v. Graves, 242 App. Div. 128, 273 N. Y. Supp. 582
(3d Dep't 1934).
Two fundamentally opposing theories have pervaded the history of Anglo-American
jurisprudence concerning the effect of a decision by a court of last resort overruling
one of its prior holdings. On the one hand it is claimed that judges mike the law;0
on the other, that .they merely declare it and that what a court declares to be the
law has always been the law, notwithstanding earlier decisions to the contrary. 4
The latter view, known as the declaratory theory, has been approved by eminent
writers 5 and has been accepted in most jurisdictions.0 Prior decisions of the New
York courts on this subject are in conflict. 7 The wisdom of the court's holding in
9. Cases cited supra notes 7 and 8; Holman v. Johnson, Cowper 341, 98 Eng. Reprint
1120 (K. B. 1775); see Reiner v. North American Newspaper Alliance, 259 N. Y. 250,
256, 181 N. E. 561, 563, 83 A. L. R. 23, 26 (1932); 3 WiLLIsTox, CONTRACTS (1920) § 1630.
1. Long v. Rockwood, 277 U. S. 142 (1928).
2. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123 (1932).
3. The following authorities support generally the proposition that the judge does not
declare but makes the law, although there is considerable disagreement among them as to
the precise function of the judge in this process. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (5th ed. 1874) c.
2; AUsTNn, JURISPRUDENCE (Campbell's ed. 1913) 268 et seq.; Thayer, Judicial Legislation
(1891) 5 HARv. L. REv. 172; GRAY, NATURE AND SOUREs or Tn. LAW (2d ed. 1921) 96104, 218-240. This theory is given considerable emphasis by the modern Realists. FaAniz,
LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930) CC. IV, VI.
4.
1. BL. Comm. *68-71.
5. CARTER, LAW ITS ORIGIN, GROWTH AND FUNCTION (1907) 78, 82 et seq.; BE, CoNFLICT OF LAW (1916) § 116; SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE (8th ed. 1930) 197.
6. Center School Township v. State, 150 Ind. 168, 49 N. E. 961 (1898); Landers v.
Tracy, 171 Ky. 657, 188 S. W. 763 (1916); Ross v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 90 N. J.
Law 522, 102 Ati. 397 (1917); Mason v. Nelson, 148 N. C. 492, 62 S. E. 625 (1908). For a
further collection of cases, see Freeman, The Protection Afforded Against the Retroactive
Operation of an Overruling Decision (1918) 18 COL. L. REv. 230.
7. Cases rejecting the declaratory doctrine are: Harris v. Jex, 55 N. Y. 421 (1874)
(legal tender case); Dauchey Co. v. Farney, 105 Misc. 470, 173 N. Y. Supp. 530 (Sup. Ct.
1918). Contra: Butler v. Van Wyck, 1 Hill 438 (Sup. Ct. 1841); see Woodruff v. Woodruff, 52 N. Y. 53, 58 (N. Y. 1873) ; Matter of Tod, 85 Misc. 298, 306, 147 N. Y. Supp. 161,
166 (Surt. Ct. 1914).
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the instant case may be questioned. To test the soundness of the major premise of
the doctrine that judges do not make but merely declare the law, would require a
philosophical dissertation on the general nature of law.8 Suffice it to say that the
doctrine has been severely criticised. 9 Passing the philosophical phase of the
subject and considering merely the pragmatic effect of the declaratory doctrine, the
conclusion is unavoidable that the application of the doctrine makes for uncertainty
in the law. Those who have regulated their actions in reliance upon prior decisions
may discover that by virtue of a subsequent overruling decision they have incurred
unintended liabilities.' 0 The layman is placed in the precarious position where he is
presumed not only to know the law, but to know it better than the judges and the
lawyers. The development of the law is obstructed, for in addition to satisfying
the requirements of stare decisis, the court must, under the declaratory doctrine,
consider the injury which may result to those who have altered their positions in
reliance upon existing decisions."
Furthermore, the doctrine is illogical. After a
decision has been overruled, the parties in the prior acton should be entitled to a
rehearing, since everyone should be entitled to a day in court with the law of the
land applied to his case. Probably the refusal of the courts to apply this line of
reasoning' 2 may be explained on the ground that it would result in endless litigation
and a hopeless congestion on court calendars.
Some courts have followed the declaratory doctrine strictly, 13 but most courts
have made an exception where contracts have been made or property rights acquired
in reliance upon a court's construction of a statute. In such cases, overruling
decisions will not be given retrospective effect. 14 Other less common exceptions have
8.

CAmozo, Gaowm or

=

LAW (1924) 32.

The confusion which surrounds not only

the practice of law, but the very meaning of the term has been aptly described by Justice
Cardozo: "Was there ever such a profession as ours anyhow? We speak of ourselves as
practicing law, as teaching it, as deciding it; and not one of us can say what law means.
Start a discussion as to its meaning, try to tell how it is born, whence it comes, out of
what we manufacture it, and before the dispute is fairly under way, the vociferous disputants will be springing at each other's throats." Address (1932), 55 Rr. N. Y. S. B. A.
263, 305.
9. ]mz,
GRAY, FP.APsx op. cit. supra note 3; dissenting opinion of Holmes, J. in Kuhn
v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U. S. 349, 371 (1910); Ausrnr, op cit. supra 321, in which the
author speaks of "the childish fiction employed by our judges, that judicial or common law
is not made by them, but is a miraculous something made by nobody, existing, I suppoze,
from eternity, and merely declared from time to time by the judges!'
10. Stockton v. Dundee Mfg. Co., 22 N. J. Eq. S6 (1871); Storrie v. Cortes, 90 Tex.
233, 38 S. W. 154 (1896).
11. Kocourek, Retraspective Decsons and Stare Decisis and a Proposal (1931) 17 A.
B. A. J. 180.
12. Parties and their privies are bound by the decision in their case, even though the
law thereof is overruled. United States v. California & Oregon Land Co., 192 U. S. 355
(1904); Cain v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 123 Ky. 59, 93 S. W. 622 (1905); Bolton v.
Hey, 16S Pa. 418, 31 Ati. 1097 (1895).
13. Allen v. Allen, 95 Cal. 184, 30 Pac. 213 (1892); Crigler v. Shepler 79 Kan. 834, 101
Pac. 619 (1909); Stockton v. Dundee Mfg. Co., 22 N, J. Eq. 56 (1871); Storrie v. Cortes,
90 Tex. 283, 38 S. W. 154 (1896).
14. Douglass v. Pike County, 101 U. S. 677 (1879); Stephenson v. Boodys 139 Ind. 60,
38 N. E. 331 (1894); Continental Supply Co. v. Abel, 95 Mont. 148, 24 P. (2d) 133
(1933); Fowle & Son v. O'Ham, 176 N. C. 12, 96 S. E. 639 (1918); see State v. Greer 88
Fla. 249, 102 So. 739, 745 (1924).
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been made in the case of contracts and property rights where there has been reliance
upon a prior interpretation of the common law 15 or where an innocent act has been
made criminal.' 0 Although these exceptions tend to alleviate the harshness of the
rule another objection is encountered. While the parties to the action (which overruled the prior decision) must suffer loss of contract or property rights because of
reliance on the prior case, subsequent petitioners are relieved by virtue of the
exceptions.' 7 This places at a disadvantage those who would litigate an apparently
valid claim. However, one court has gone so far in an attempt to avoid this result
that it has, after overruling an unsound decision, refused to apply its ruling to the
parties before the court who had entered into contractual relations in reliance upon
the earlier decision.' s The Supreme Court, having decided that retrospective decisions do not violate the impairment of contract, 10 ex post facto, 20 or due process 21
provisions of the Constitution, has adopted a laissez-faire attitude on the subject, 22
except where the federal courts have original jurisdiction. 23 Because of the many
objections to the declaratory doctrine, and its several inconsistencies, its application
in the instant case is regrettable.

CRIMINAL LAW-RIGHT OF STATE TO WRIT OF ERnoR.-The defendant's demurrer
to the information in a criminal case was sustained on the ground that the statute
was unconstitutional. A writ of error sued out by the state of Connecticut was
contested on the ground that in the absence of statute the state has no right to
appeal. The defendant moved to erase the case from the docket. Held, that the
state was entitled to a review of the action of the lower court. Motion denied.
State v. Muolo, 118 Conn. 373, 172 Atl. 875 (1934).
As the pertinence of criminal prosecutions to the commonweal impresses Itself
more clearly upon the national consciousness, the right of the state to have an

15. Jones v. Woodstock Iron Co., 95 Ala. 551, 10 So. 635 (1892); Harmon v. Auditor
of Public Acc'ts, 123 Ill. 122, 13 N. E. 161 (1887); Bradshaw v. Mill Co., 52 Minn. 59, 53
N. W. 1066 (1892); Hill v. Brown, 144 N. C. 117, 56 S. E. 693 (1907). But see Falconer
v. Simmons, 51 W. Va. 172, 177, 41 S. E. 193, 196 (1902).
16. State v. O'Neil, 147 Iowa 513, 126 N. W. 454 (1910); State v. Longino, 109 Miss.
125, 67 So. 902 (1915); State v. Bell, 136 N. C. 674, 49 S. E. 163 (1904).
17. See Von Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort (1924) 37 HAPe. L.
Rxv. 409, 426.
18. Montana Horse Products Co. v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 91 Mont. 194, 7 P.
(2d) 919 (1932); Sunburst Oil & Refining Co. v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 91 Mont. 216, 7
P. (2d) 927 (1932). It would appear that such part of the decision as attempted to overrule a prior case would be dictum since not necessary to its final determination. See (1933)
42 Yale L. J. 779. Such a method would be outright legislation. See Von Moschzisker, op.
cit. supra note 19, p. 426.
19. New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Refining Co., 125 U. S. 18 (1888).
20. Ross v. Oregon, 227 U. S. 150 (1913).
21. Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U. S. 103 (1895); cf. Muhlker v. New York &
Harlem R. R. Co., 197 U. S. 544 (1905).
22. Great Northern R. R. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U. S. 358 (1932).
23. When federal courts have original jurisdiction, an overruling decision will not be
given retrospective effect to interfere with.contract rights acquired in reliance on the earlier
decision. Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U. S. 175 (1863); Douglass v. Pike County,
101 U. S. 677 (1879); Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U. S. 444 (1924).
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appellate court review the determination of an inferior tribunal assumes a position
of undeniable prominence. That the origin of the problem rather early found its
way into the common law, and that its background is engagingly controversial, is
attested to by the cases of the last four centuries. Early English law permitted a
writ of error to issue at the request of the crown even where the case had been
submitted to a jury.1 Such a practice is believed to be based upon the misapplication of a dictum.2 The common law of this country never recognized that early
English practice and granted the defendant alone the right to a new trial or a
writ of error in a criminal case.3 It is now generally held that upon judgment for
5
the defendant on a demurrer the writ will not lie,4 unless granted by statute.
Even when a statutory provision exists, it is construed strictly against the state's
0
right to appeal, since it is generally in derogation of the common law. The practice of issuing a writ of error on behalf of the state is not a common one. A Mary7
land case is the first reported decision on this subject in this country. It was based
8
on early English law and several unreported cases in Mlaryland, and there have
0
Even if the issuing
been decisions to the same effect in a few other jurisdictions.
not
be prohibited by the
it
would
of the writ would constitute double jeopardy,
Connecticut Constitution, which does not grant protection to those who have been
placed in jeopardy. Nor would it be forbidden by the Fifth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution,' 0 which is not binding upon the state governments." In
addition, Connecticut courts, relative to the common law prohibition, hold that
there has been no jeopardy until the defendant has gone through every stage of a
prosecution, which is not concluded until both the facts and the law applicable to
1. Rex v. Tucker, Show. P. C. 1S6 (1694) (where the right of the King to a writ of
error is not contested by the defendant).
2. See United States v. Sanges, 144 U. S. 310, 312 (1892); State v. Woodruff, 2 Day
504, 507 (Conn. 1807).
3. United States v. Sanges, 144 U. S. 310 (1892).
4. United States v. Sanges, 144 U. S. 310 (1892); Commonwealth v. Cummings, 3
Cush. 212 (Mlass. 1849); People v. Coming, 2 N. Y. 9 (1884).
5. People v. Apple, 57 Cal. App. 110, 206 Pac. 437 (1913); People v. Zobel, 54 Colo.
284, 130 Pac. 837 (1913); State v. Robertson, 28 Okla. Cr. 234, 230 Pac. 932 (1924); State
v. Spencer, 37 S. D. 219, 157 N. W. 662 (1916). See N. Y. CoDE CRPxL PnOC. (1881) § 518,
as amended by Laws of 1927, c. 337: "An appeal to an appellate court may be taken by
the people in the following cases: 1. Upon judgment for the defendant, on a demurrer
to the indictment; 2. Upon an order of the court, arresting judgment; 3. Upon an order
of the court, granting a motion made upon the minutes of the grand jury dismim-ing an
indictment; 4. In all cases when an appeal may be taken by the defendant, except where
a verdict or judgment of not guilty has been rendered."
6. State v. Raymond, 18 Colo. 242, 32 Pac. 429 (1893); State v. Northrup, 13 Mont.
522, 35 Pac. 228 (1893); State v. Weathers, 13 Okla. Cr. 92, 162 Pac. 239 (1917).
7. State v. Buchanan, 5 Harris & J. 317 (Md. 1821).
s. State v. Messersmith & Askew; State v. Forney; State v. Brown; State v. Durham.
All were decided in the Court of Oyer and Terminer, Baltimore County, Md., and dted in
State v. Buchanan, 5 Harris & J. 317 (Md. 1321).
9. People v. Swift, 59 Mich. 529, 26 N. W. 694 (1886); State v. Meyer, 65 N. J. L.
233, 47 Atl. 435 (1900); Commonwealth v. Capp, 48 Pa. 53 (1864).
10. ". . . nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb."
11. Fox v. Ohio, 46 U. S. 410 (1847); 1 BisOP, Cmnai=AL LAw (9th ed. 1923) § 98.
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the facts have been finally determined. 12 In the instant case there had been merely
a demurrer and consequently the double jeopardy question was not involved.

While

the court, in the principal case, recognized that in no other case had a writ of error
been granted to a state except where permitted by statute, it nevertheless granted
the writ, arguing that, since Connecticut had not adopted the common law of England, the English rule was not conclusive as to the common law of that state.la
This view has been adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States relative to
federal procedure.' 4 There is no valid reason why the state in its criminal prosecution should be barred from the benefits held out to the defendants, and where the
law is silent as to the right of a state to appeal from the errors of its lower courts,
justice demands that it be permitted.

INFANTS-CONTRACTs-REcOUPMENT BY DEFENDANT VENDOR.-The plaintiff, while
an infant, purchased shares of stock from defendant falsely representing his age to
be over twenty-one. A year and a half after reaching majority he disaffirmed and
sought recovery of the amount paid for the stock. One of the defenses interposed
by the defendant was the worthlessness of the stock tendered back at the time of
disaffirmance. The trial court ruled against this defense. On appeal to the Appellate
Term, held, that the ruling of the trial court on this defense was correct. Sternlieb
v. Normandie Nat. Securities Corp., 152 Misc. 303, 273 N. Y. Supp. 229 (Sup.
Ct. 1934).'
An infant is permitted to rescind his contract and is not estopped from pleading
his infancy although he has wilfully misrepresented his age. 2 Neither is he liable in
tort for fraud and deceit for such misrepresentation arising out of and forming part
12. State v. Lee, 65 Conn. 265, 30 At. 1110 (1894).
13. Card v. Grinman, 5 Conn. 164 (1823); Baldwin v. Walker, 21 Conn. 168
Graham v. Walker, 78 Conn. 130, 61 Atl. 98 (1905). Contra: Commonwealth v.
7 Mass. 244 (1810) ; State v. Smith, 32 Me. 369 (1851) ; State v. Moore, 26 N. H. 448
14. Funk v. United States, 290 U. S. 371 (1933) (holding a wife a competent
in a criminal case).

(1851);
Newell,
(1853).
witness

1. The principal case is distinct from Sternlieb v. Normandie Nat. Securities Corp., 263
N. Y. 245, 188 N. E. 726 (1934), which case has already been considered by the Court
of Appeals on the question of whether an infant may be estopped from asserting his Infancy
where he has fraudulently misrepresented his age.
2. Myers v. Hurley Motor Co., 273 U. S. 18 (1926); Sternlieb v. Normandle Nat,
Securities Corp., 263 N. Y. 245, 188 N. E. 726, 90 A. L. R. 1441 (1934); R. Leslie, Ltd.
v. Sheill, [1914] 3 K. B. 607; 1 WILL~sToN, CONTRACTS (1920) § 245. Contra: Pinnacle
Motor Co. v. Dougherty, 231 Ky. 626, 21 S. W. (2d) 1001 (1929); Commander v. Brazile,
88 Miss. 668, 41 So. 497 (1906); La Rosa v. Nichols, 92 N. J. L. 375, 105 At. 201
(1918); Tuck v. Payne, 159 Tenn. 192, 17 S. W. (2d) 8 (1929). Some of the western
states have changed this rule by statute. IOWA CODE (1927) § 10494; KAN. REV. STAT.
(1923) § 38-103; UTAH REV. STAT. ANN. (1917) § 3957; VAsu. REV. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1922) § 5830.
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of the contract. 3 Since the right of an infant to rescind is equitable in nature,4 he
will be compelled to do equity by requiring of him the return of the property received
under the contract, 5 or by making him account for the benefits received thereunder. 6
But where no benefit has been received, or the property has been squandered or dissipated, this will not prevent the infant from asserting his right of rescission and
recovery.7 However, where the infant, after having fraudulently induced the vendor
to enter into the contract through misrepresentation of his age, seeks affirmative
relief, he is no longer using his infancy as a "shield," but is wielding it as a "sword."
In such cases some courts, while they will not deny the infant's right to recover the
money paid on the contract, will permit the vendor to recoup out of the infant's
money, damages for deterioration of the property or for the reasonable value of
its use.8 Such recoupment has been allowed only where the contract has been a
fair and provident one for the infant and where the benefits have actually been
received by him. Some of the benefits recognized by the courts have resulted from:
the use of a bicycle; 9 the use of a motorcycle;' o the use of an automobile;" repairs
to an automobile.' 2 In the principal case the court applied the equitable rule prevailing in New York. 13 Evidently the courts find little weight in the arguments
advanced by those realists who, pointing to the wisdom of modem youth,' 4 urge
3. Monumental Bldg. Ass'n v. Herman, 33 Md. 128 (1870); Slayton v. Barry, 175
Mass. 513, 56 N. E. 574 (1900); Knudson v. General Motorcycle Sales Co., 230 Macs. 54,
119 N. E. 359 (1918); Greensboro Morris Plan Co. v. Palmer, 195 X. C. 109, 116 S. E.
261 (1923); Brown v. McCune, 5 Sandf. 224 (N. Y. 1851); Nash v. Jewett, 61 VL
501, 18 Atl. 47 (1889); Johnson v. Pye, 1 Keb. 905, 83 Eng. Reprints 353 (1665). See 1
COOLEY, ToRTs *123. But some jurisdictions proceed on the theory that the misrepresentation as to age is unconnected with the contract and therefore hold the infant liable
in tort for fraud and deceit. Rice v. Boyer, 108 Ind. 472, 9 N. E. 420 (1886); Fitts v.
Hall, 9 N. H. 441 (1838); Wisconsin Loan and Finance Corp. v. Goodnough, 201 WIs.
101, 228 N. W. 484, 67 A. L. R. 1264 (1930).

4. Rice v. Butler, 160 N. Y. 578, 55 N. E. 275 (1899); 2 KYr-'s Coa _m ur,s *240.
5. In Re Huntenberg, 153 Fed. 76S (E. D. N. Y. 1907); Gray v. Grimm, 157 Ky. 603,
163 S. W. 762 (1914); Walker v. Walker, 253 Ky. 378, 69 S. W. (2d) 716 (1934); see
Scnonum, Domsrrc eRu.Aoxs (6th ed. 1921) § 1051.
6. Berglund v. Am. Multigraph Sales Co., 135 Minn. 67, 160 N. W. 191 (1916);
Wooldridge v. Lavoie, 79 N. H. 21, 104 AtL 346 (1918).
7. See ScnotLim, Do -ce Ra rons (6th ed. 1921) § 1051.
8. M yers v. Hurley Motor Co., 273 U. S. 18, 50 A. L. R. 1187 (1927); Freitas v.
Cordeiro, 122 Cal. App. 319, 9 P. (2d) 882 (1932); Godfrey v. Mutual Finance Corp.,
242 Mass. 197, 136 N. E. 178 (1922); Steigerwalt v. Woodhead Co., Inc., 186 Minn.
558, 244 N. W. 412 (1932); Rice v. Butler, 160 N. Y. 578, 55 N. E. 275 (1899). Contra:
McCarty-Greene Motor Co. v. McCluney, 219 Ala. 211, 121 So. 713 (1929). But cf.
Utterstrom v. Myron D. Kidder, Inc., 124 Me. 10, 124 At. 725 (1924).
9. Rice v. Butler, 160 N. Y. 578, 55 N. E. 275 (1899).
10. Pettit v. Liston, 97 Ore. 464, 191 Pac. 660 (1920). But cf. Raymond v. General
Motorcycle Co., 230 Mass. 54, 119 N. E. 359 (1918).
11. MYers v. Hurley Motor Co., 273 U. S. 18, 50 A. L. R. 1187 (1927); Sparandera
v. Staten Island Garage, Inc., 117 Misc. 780, 193 N. Y. Supp. 392 (Alun. Ct. 1921); c-w
Watters v. Arrington, 39 Ga. App. 275, 276, 146 S.E. 773, 774 (1929).
12. Egnaczyk v. Rowland, 148 Misc. 889, 267 N. Y. Supp. 14 (1933).
13. Rice v. Butler, 160 N. Y. 57S, 55 N. E. 275 (1899), cited note 4, supra; 2 YKu.',
op. dt. supra note 4.
14. See Kennedy, The New Deal in the Law, N. Y. L. J., Sept. 13, 1934, at 721;
Legis. (1935) 4 Foannxs L. Rv. 55, n. 9.
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that the reasons for the infancy rule no longer exist in fact, and favor a relaxation
of the strict doctrine.15 While New York does recognize the changing conditions,
it does not feel justified in departing from a long line of well reasoned decisions.10
The courts have been careful to distinguish actual benefits from intangible speculative benefits 1' and have refused to consider the equitable plea of one dealing with
an infant where the benefits are highly uncertain and speculative. Apparently the
courts impose on such vendors a stricter duty of ascertaining with whom they
are dealing.

INSURANcE-BENEFICIARIES-CoMMON
DISASTER-BURDEN OF PRoor.-Husband
and wife died in a common disaster. It was impossible to determine who predeceased.
The wife was the beneficiary of the husband's life insurance policy wherein was
contained the clause: "If any beneficiary die before the insured, the interest of such
beneficiary will vest in the executors or administrators of the insured unless otherwise
provided herein." The husband had a right to change the beneficiary, but this right
had not been exercised. From a judgment for the defendant and the denial of a
motion for a new trial, the plaintiff brought error. Held, that the wife's present interest in the policy could be defeated only by the happening of a condition subsequent, and that the husband's administrator had the burden of proving the
happening of the condition. Judgment reversed. Two judges dissented. Roberts v.
Hardin, 175 S. E. 362 (Ga. 1934).
The rule that where a number of persons perish in a common disaster there are
no presumptions as to survivorship arising because of age, sex, or condition of
health,1 is followed in all jurisdictions having no statute on the subject.2 The burden
of proving survivorship falls on the party asserting it, and where this burden is
not sustained, the funds are distributed as though both parties had died simultaneously. 3 The question as to who has- the burden of proving survivorship is
generally determined on either or both of two grounds: (1) the interest the beneficiary has in the policy as determined by the general rule of reservation or nonreservation of right to change the beneficiary, and (2) the intent of the insured
regarding the distribution of the proceeds as derived from other clauses in the policy.
Where there is no right to change the beneficiary, it is generally held that the one
so designated has a vested interest in the policy.4 In one case it has been held
that an irrevocable trust is created. 5 Where the insured has the right to change the

15. Pettit v. Liston, 97 Ore. 464, 191 Pac. 660 (1920).
16. See Sternlieb v. Normandie Nat. Securities Corp., 263 N. Y. 245, 251, 188 N. E.
726, 728 (1934).

17. Mordecai v. Pearl, 63 Hun 553, 18 N. Y. Supp. 543 (Sup. Ct. 1892), af'd 136
N. Y. 625, 32 N. E. 1014 (1892); cf. Joseph v. Schatzkin, 259 N. Y, 241, 181
N. E. 464 (1932).
1. Modem Woodsmen v. Parido, 335 Ill. 239, 167 N. B. 52 (1929); McComas v. Wiley,
134 Md. 572, 108 AtI. 196 (1919).
2. VAcE, INsURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 604n.
3. Young Women's Christian Home v. French, 187 U. S. 401 (1903); Carpenter v.
Severin, 201 Iowa 969, 204 N. V. 448 (1925).
4. Wallace v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 97 Minn. 27, 106 N. W. 84 (1906);
Whitehead v. New York Life Ins. Co., 102 N. Y. 143, 6 N. E. 267 (1886); VANCE,
INsURANCE (2d ed. 1930) §§ 144-145.
5. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. of Newark, N. J. v. Cummings, 66 Ore. 272, 133 Pac.
1169 (1913).
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beneficiary at -will, the general rule is that the beneficiary has only an expectancy.0
Some of the courts, it would seem, make use of the above rules to determine the
interest the beneficiary had in the policy at the time of the common disaster. Other
clauses in the policy are then applied thereto, not to give expression to the intent
of the insured, but to ascertain whether or not they affect such interest. Once having
come to a conclusion as to the kind of interest, the burden of proof of survivorship
is made dependent solely thereon. 7 It has been held in other jurisdictions that the
intent of the insured is of primary importance in deciding upon whom the burden
of proof rests, and the-change-of-beneficiary test has there been disregarded 8 A
third group looks to the intent of the insured, but in support thereof takes into
consideration whether or not there has been a reservation of power to change the
beneficiary at will.9 This last would seem to be the best rule of the three.
In this case, the majority decided the issue on the intent of the insured as derived
from the language of the policy without considering the question of interest except
to state that the wife's interest was subject to be defeated by the happening of a
condition subsequent. The minority followed the third group and considered the
type of interest in the beneficiary in conjunction with the insured's intention,
expressed in the clause, denoting to whom the proceeds were to go in the event the
beneficiary predeceased him.
It is difficult to see how the clause, "if any beneficiary die before the insured, the
interest of such beneficiary will vest in the executors of the insured," can mean that
the insured or his estate take only in case he survives the beneficiary. The more
logical interpretation would seem to be that the beneficiary must survive in order
to take the proceeds.i O It is doubtful that the insured wanted them to go to the
beneficiary's estate, for if he had, a provision to that effect could have been written
in the policy. It would appear that the above-quoted clause merely indicates the
insured's intention as to whom the proceeds are to go in the event the beneficiary
does not survive him." It must be remembered that he is the maker of the policy
6. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Swett, 222 Fed. 200 (C.C. A. 6th, 1915); New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Daley, 25 Cal. App. 376, 143 Pac. 1033 (1914); Quist v. Western &
Southern Life Ins. Co., 219 Mich. 406, 1S9 N. W. 49 (1922); Riley v. Wirth, 313 Pa. 362,
169 AtI. 139 (1933). Contra: Resnek v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 190 N. E. 603 (fan. 1934),
where it was held that the beneficiary had a qualified vested interest; see Kochanek v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 262 Mass. 174, 177, 159 N. E. 520, 522 (1928).
7. United States Casualty Co. v. Kacer, 169 Mlo. 301, 69 S. W. 370 (1902); cf. Watldns
v. Home Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 137 Ark. 207, 203 S. W. 587 (1919) (same result
reached as in preceding case but beneficiary had only a qualified interest in the policy and
not a vested interest as therein). But cf. Matter of Hammer, 101 Misc. 351, 163 N. Y.
Supp. 588 (Surr. Ct. 1917).
S. Dunn v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 141 App. Div. 478, 126 N. Y. Supp. 229 (1st
Dep't 1910).
9. Middeke v. Balder, 193 Ill. 590, 64 N. E. 1002 (1902); Fleming v. Grimes, 142 Mss.
522, 107 So. 420 (1926); Hildenbrandt v. Ames, 27 Tex. Civ. App. 377, 66 S. W. 128
(1901). In the last case the court said: "We think the question can be properly determined
by a consideration of the nature of the contract of insurance, the character of the interest
which the beneficiary has in such contract, and the intention of the parties as evidenced
by the language of the contract, and the object sought to be obtained by its creation."
10. Smith v. Met. Life Ins. Co. of New York, 222 Pa. 226, 71 At]. 11 (1903).
11. And the rule is fundamental that in any contract the courts should give effect to
the intention of the parties as ascertained therefrom. Stoddard v. Banker's Life Co., 10
N. E. 628 (Ind. App. 1934).
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and it is unlikely, where nothing is said to the contrary, that he would place the
burden of proving survivorship on his estate, especially after he has indicated that
he wants the proceeds to go to the estate should the beneficiary predecease him.
The majority of the cases on this subject are in accord with the result reached by
the minority herein, 12 although the reasoning by which the courts arrive at that
result has not in every case been the same.

MORTGAGES-FoRECLOSURE-LABILITY

OF RECEIVER FOR FAILURE TO REPAIR.-A

receiver in foreclosure proceedings was appointed with authority to keep the mortgaged premises in repair and "to employ such help and appoint such agents as may
be necessary for the proper maintenance and superintendence of the property." A
tenant in said premises "sustained injuries by reason of a ceiling falling and striking
her." She obtained an ex parte order granting leave to sue the receiver to recover
damages for her injuries. From an order of the Special Term denying the receiver's
motion to vacate this ex parte order, the receiver appealed. Held, that a receiver of
rents and profits in mortgage foreclosure proceedings is not liable to tenants injured
by a falling ceiling merely because of receiver's failure to keep premises in repair.
Order reversed. Two judges dissented. Alta Holding Co., Inc. v. Ninson Realty
Corp. et al., 241 App. Div. 166, 271 N. Y. Supp. 556 (1st Dep't 1934); New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Hazlitt Realty Corp., 241 App. Div. 169, 271 N. Y. Supp, 560 (1st
Dep't 1934).3
Leave to sue receiver must be obtained from the court which appointed him. 2
In the absence of proper authorization to repair he is not liable as receiver for
acting negligently or for failing to act.3 Where he has been authorized he is liable
in his capacity of receiver for active or affirmative negligence. 4 As to whether leave
12. Dunn v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 141 App. Div. 478, 126 N. Y. Supp. 229

(1st Dep't 1910); Matter of Hammer, 101 Misc. 351, 168 N. Y. Supp. 588 (Surr. Ct.
1917); McGowin v. Menken, 223 N. Y. 509, 119 N. E. 877 (1918); cases cited note 9, supra.
1. These two cases were decided by the First Department of the Appellate Division
on the same day. In the Alta Case, Finch, P.J., and Merrell and Martin, J3., favored
the receiver's motion that the ex parte order granting leave to sue him be vacated. O'Malley
and Untermeyer, JJ., dissented. In the New York Life Case, Finch, P.J., and Martin
and Townley, JJ., favored the motion, while O'Malley and Glennon, JJ., dissented.
Thus in the First Department four Justices held that leave should not be granted to a
tenant to sue a receiver of rents and profits, who has been authorized to repair, for damages
arising from his failure to repair, while the remaining three maintained that such leave
should be given. If the dissenting three Justices, O'Malley, Untermeyer and Glennon, had
been sitting together on one or both of the cases, the decision in that case or the decisions
in those cases would have been three to two the other way.
2. M'atter of Fischer, 168 App. Div. 326, 153 N. Y. Supp. 1008 (1st Dep't 1915);
Gabriele v. Kent, 150 Misc. 415, 270 N. Y. Supp. 33 (App. Term, 2d Dep't 1934);
3 JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928)

1951.

3. Matter of Fischer, 168 App. Div. 326, 153 N. Y. Supp. 1008 (1st Dep't 1915);
Lichtenstein v. Belknap, 100 Misc. 468, 165 N. Y. Supp. 936 (App. Term, 1st Dep't 1917);
Birchfield v. Davenport Shore Club, Inc., 223 App. Div. 767, 227 N. Y. Supp. 624 (2d
Dep't 1928); Gabriele v. Kent, 150 Misc. 415, 270 N. Y. Supp. 33 (App. Term, 2d Dep't
1934).
4. Lichtenstein v. Belknap, 100 Misc. 468, 165 N. Y. Supp. 936 (App. Term, 1st Dep't
1917); Birchfield v. Davenport Shore Club, Inc., 223 App. Div. 767, 227 N. Y. Supp. 624
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should be granted to sue the receiver for damages arising from his failure to act
where he is given proper authorization to repair the courts of the First and Second 0
Departments are at variance and the question has not yet been decided by the
Court of Appeals. The cases which refuse such leave are apparently based on Matter
of Fischer,7 which can be distinguished from the cases under consideration. In Matter
of Fischer the authority of the receiver presumably was limited to collecting the
rents, issues and profits, and no authority to repair, such as was found here, was
disclosed in the record on appeal. It is now the custom to give a receiver authority
to maintain and repair at the outset.
Since the owner's liability for failure to repair is based upon his control of the
premises,8 he should not be liable for failure to repair conditions arising after the
receiver has entered upon his duties.0 However, the tenant during the receivership
is held to strict performance on his part of the obligations under his leaseYo
It would be manifestly fair and just, in view of his taking control of the premises
and the relinquishing of control by the owner, that the receiver, where be has been
authorized to repair, should be held liable for failure to make repairs after notice
of need for same, and in the absence of direct authority in the order appointing
him, that he should seek an order granting him such authority.

PRACTICE-LNDEMNITY-PROPRIETY or LaDEMNITEE's SERVING CROSS-COIPLANT
ON CO-DEFENDANT LNDEMNrroR-NEw YoRx CiviL PRAcTIcE AcT, SEcTIoN 264-

The plaintiff, suing in negligence, joined as defendants the corporate owner of the
building wherein an accident occurred, a sub-contractor, and others. In its answer
the owner set up a claim against the co-defendants, alleging that any liability fixed
upon the owner would be due solely to their negligence. This relief was demanded
pursuant to the New York Civil Practice Act, Section 264, which provides for such
a remedy "where the judgment may determine the ultimate rights of two or more
(2d Dep't 1928); Equitable Life Assurance Soc. v. Ninson Realty Corp., 151 Misc. 195,
270 N. Y. Supp. 32 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
5. Woman's Hospital of N. Y. v. Loubern Realty Corp., 240 App. Div. 949, 267 N. Y.
Supp. 996 (1st Dep't 1933); Equitable Life Assurance Soc. v. Ninson Realty Corp., 151
Misc. 195, 270 N. Y. Supp. 32 (Sup. Ct. 1934) (receiver is liable for only affirmative acts);
Hauben v. Murphy, N. Y. L. J., January 20, 1934 at 329 (Sup. C.); Matter of Garvin,
N. Y. L. J., March 5, 1934 at 1069 (Sup. Ct.); Irving Savings Bank v. Soro Coast. Corp.,
N. Y. L. J., March 13, 1934 at 1211 (Sup. Ct.); 3 JoN.Es, MoRTmcms (8th ed. 1928) 1951.
6. City Real Estate Co. v. Realty Const. Corp., 240 App. Div. 1000, 268 N. Y. Supp.
953 (2d Dep't 1933); Krohn v. Silverman, 240 App. Div. 911, 267 N. Y. Supp. 1017
(2d Dep't 1933); Gabriele v. Kent, 150 Misc. 415, 270 N. Y. Supp. 33 (App. Term, 2d
Dep't 1934) where the court wrote at 417, 270 N. Y. Supp. at 36: "No reason seems to exist
for exempting a receiver, as such, from liability for a negligent om's on to act, when under
the same circumstances, had he acted negligently, he would have been liable.' Cusimano v.
Strong, 241 App. Div. 766, 270 N. Y. Supp. 542 (2d Dep't 1934): "Leave should be granted to
sue receiver of rents in foreclosure action for injuries, if facts presented on application
indicate prima fade case of receiver's negligence."
7. 168 App. Div. 326, 153 N. Y. Supp. 1008 (1st Dep't 1915).
8. Cullings v. Goetz, 256 N. Y. 287, 176 N. E. 397 (1931); Lafredo v. Bush Terminal
Co., 261 N. Y. 323, 185 N. E. 398 (1933).
9. But see Wyckoff v. Scofield, 103 N. Y. 630, 633, 9 N. E. 498, 499 (18S6).
10. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Childs Co., 230 N. Y. 285, 130 N. E. 295 (1921);
Prudence Co. v. 160 West 73d St. Corp., 260 N. Y. 205, 183 N. E. 365 (1932).
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defendants as between themselves." Upon the granting of the co-defendant's motion
to strike out the cross-complaint, the defendant appealed. Held, that a motion
by the sub-contractor to strike out the cross-complaint must be denied. Judgment
reversed.

Birchall v. Clemons Co., Inc., 241 App. Div. 286, 271 N. Y. Supp. 547

(1st Dep't 1934).
The right of a party blameless in fact but legally liable for the negligence of
another to be indemnified by the latter is well settled.'

But the decisions have

held quite uniformly that an indemnitee has no cause of action for damages until
he has suffered actual monetary loss.2 In the principal case, to avoid a multiplicity
of actions,3 the court is apparently sanctioning a procedure which permits the indemnitee to procure a judgment against his indemnitor before suffering actual damage.
The modem declaratory judgment has been used in several cases to afford similar
relief. 4 In England the rule of the instant case has obtained for many years.5 In

New York the right of an undamaged defendant to recover against his indemnitor
(or joint tort-feasor) in the same action in which he is sued has been recognized
in two types of cases (specified in a leading lower-court decision0 construing a section of the Civil Practice Act parallel to Section 264),7 viz., (1) where the third
party is liable to the plaintiff jointly or severally with the defendant s or where
either he or the defendant (but not both) is so liable for the claim sued upon;0

and (2) where, irrespective of the third person's liability to the plaintiff for the
claim sued upon, he is liable to indemnify the defendant thereon.10 Dictum in a
1. Oceanic Steam Navigation Company v. Compania Transatlantica, 134 N. Y. 461,
31 N. E. 987 (1892); Comment (1932) 32 CoL. L. R.v. 94; Comment (1931) 45 1-u"v.
L. REv. 349.
2. Village of Port Jervis v. First Nat. Bank, 96 N. Y. 550 (1884); Oceanic Steam
Navigation Company v. Compania Transatlantica, 134 N. Y. 461, 31 N. E. 987 (1892);
Dunn v. Uvalde, 175 N. Y. 214, 67 N. E. 439 (1903).
3. The purpose of N. Y. Civ. PaAc. Acr (1921) § 264, is to avoid a multiplicity of
actions. Bigelow v. Dubuque, 141 Misc. 29, 252 N. Y. Supp. 79 (Sup. Ct. 1930); Cohen v.
Dugan Bros., 134 Misc. 155, 235 N. Y. Supp. 118 (Sup. Ct. 1929).
4. BORcHARD, D=cLARATOR-" JuDGo=s (1st ed. 1934) 384, and cases there cited.
5. Order XVI A, rules 1 and 12, Rules of the Supreme Court of England (1929). For
citations of cases interpreting these sections, see BALL, WATmOUOII, CLARx A HILLs, T=a
ANNumA PRAccm- (52d ed. 1934) 297 et seq., 312.
6. May v. Mott, 121 Misc. 398, 201 N. Y. Supp. 189 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
7. N. Y. Civ. PRc. Acr (1921) § 193 (2), authorizing any party to the action to
apply for the bringing in of a third party where the latter "is or will be liable to such
party ... for the claim made against such party in the action."
8. Hailfinger v. Meyer, 215 App. Div. 35, 212 N. Y. Supp. 746 (4th Dep't 1929);
Greenhouse v. Rochester Taxicab Co., 218 App. Div. 224, 218 N. Y. Supp. 167 (4th Dep't
1926) (impleader denied on facts-court recognizes right in indemnity cases); Hanca v.
Bero Engineering Constr. Corp., 230 App. Div. 332, 243 N. Y. Supp. 657 (4th Dep't 1930).
But cf. Fox v. Western Motor Lines, Inc., 257 N. Y. 305, 178 N. E. 289 (1931).
9. Fedden v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal, 204 App. Div. 741, 199 N. Y. Supp.
9 (2d Dep't 1923) (master and servant); Travlos v. Commercial Union, 217 App. Dlv.
362, 217 N. Y. Supp. 459 (1st Dep't 1926) (principal and agent).
10. Day v. Fifth Ave. & 43d St. Building Corp., 231 App. Div. 89, 246 N. Y. Supp.
380 (1st Dep't 1930); Eighth and Ninth Avenues Railway Co. v. City of N. Y., 224
App. Div. 467, 231 N. Y. Supp. 259 (1st Dep't 1928). May v. Mott, 121 Misc. 398, 201
N. Y. Supp. 189 (Sup. Ct. 1923), which enunciated the rule illustrated by the two foregoing cases, construed the word "indemnify" narrowly, apparently as meaning a specific
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recent New York Court of Appeals case" appears to modify the first of the above
two classifications to the extent of declaring that a liability over, either through
indemnity or contribution or otherwise, must exist at the time the application to
implead the third party is made. Strictly speaking, there is no existing liability in
the principal case running from the indemnitor to the indemnitee at the time of the
service of the cross-complaint. These cases, however, are distinguishable. The
Court of Appeals case involved an additional statute, Section 211-a of the New
York Civil Practice Act, which in express terms negatives a cause of action in
favor of one joint tort-feasor against another until the party seeking contribution
has paid all or part of the judgment rendered against him. Moreover, coincident
with this decision, the Court handed down another opinion which expressly recognizes
the right of a defendant, sued for breach of warranty of title to real property, to
implead a grantor who was liable over to the defendant, having conveyed to the
latter by a deed containing a similar warranty. 12
One apparent weakness is manifested by decisions such as that in the instant
case. It would appear that if the indemnitee obtains a judgment against his indemnitor, the former is in a position to levy execution before he has discharged
his own liability. A significant case involving Section 264 met the situation by
providing that if the indemnitee were obliged to pay his judgment, be would in
that event, and in that event only, have judgment against his indemnitor.13 It is
agreement to indemnify. This interpretation does not extend the common-law rule, for
an indemnitor who has contracted to save another harmless from liability has always been
held liable to his indemnitee even though the latter has not paid the debt. SrEDGvne,
D umars (9th ed. 1912) § 786. However, Municipal Service Real Estate Company v.
D. B. & Al. Holding Corp., 257 N. Y. 423, 178 N. E. 745, 78 A. L. R. 323 (1931) appears
to extend the rule. The case admitted the impleader of a third party liable over to
the defendant where no agreement to indemnify was involved. But cf. Nichols v. Clark,
Maclullen and Riley, Inc., 261 N. Y. 118, 134 N. E. 729 (1933) where impleader was
denied because it appeared from the pleadings that the third party might not be liable
over to the defendant even if the defendant were held liable to the plaintiff. New York
therefore seems to admit of impleader in indemnity cases whether the indenmitor is liable
by agreement or otherwise, but it must definitely appear that the indemnitor will b2
liable to the indemnitee if the latter is held liable to his plaintiff.
11. See Fox v. Western Motor Lines, Inc., 257 N. Y. 305, 307, 178 N. E. 289, 289
(1931). This case involves N. Y. Civ. Pruc. Acr (1921) § 193 (2), the language of
which differs in wording from § 264, although seemingly not to an extent which would
justify any court in holding that the one section authorizes a cause of action by an
undamaged defendant against his indemnitor while the other section does not. In view
of the wording of an additional statute considered in the opinion (N. Y. Crv. Pnc. Acr
[1921J § 211-a) which specifically requires the tort-feasor to have paid all or part of
his judgment before demanding contribution, the decision appears technically sound. For
a discussion of the case in the lower courts, although primarily on another point, tee
Rothschild, Contribution between Tort-feasors (1931) 6 ST. Jom;'s L. Rzv. 1; tee also
Comment (1932) 1 BRooxLrr- L. R-v. 110.
12. Municipal Service Real Estate Company v. D. B. & B1. Holding Corp., 257 N. Y.
423, 178 N. E. 745, 78 A. L. R. 323 (1931). This case and Fox v. Western Motor Lins,
Inc., 257 N. Y. 305, 178 N. E. 2S9 were both decided on Nov. 17, 1931.
13. Cohen v. Dugan Bros., 134 Misc. 155, 235 N. Y. Supp. 118 (Sup. Ct. 1929); rev'd
in memorandum decision unless plaintiff consented to a reduction in damages, 227 App.
Div. 714, 236 N. Y. Supp. 769 (1st Dep't 1929). The reader is referred to the actual
judgment which is not contained in the reported decision. It is on file in the Bronx
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settled, however, that in actions at law judgments should be certain and not conditional, and ought not to rest upon what may or may not take place after their
rendition. 14 The question has been set at rest in England by a statute which provides that execution in this type of case "shall not be issued without leave of the
Court or a Judge until after satisfaction by the defendant of the judgment against
him.' 5 It is submitted that New York could profitably pursue a similar course.
Such a statute would meet the reason for the common-law indemnitor-indemnitee
rule; namely, that a party should suffer damage before he collects damages. It
would also achieve the twin results of sparing the courts a multiplicity of suits
without substantial injury to the rights of parties and of removing the present uncertainty which attends the rendering of a conditional judgment by a court of law.

PROCESS-SUBSTITUTED SERVICE-RESIDENCE As DISTINGUISHED FROM DoMIcILE.The defendant, domiciled in Virginia, made frequent visits to New York City,
stopping on each occasion at a certain hotel. The plaintiff issued a summons dated July
8, 1933, and tried unsuccessfully to serve defendant personally within the state.
The plaintiff obtained an order on August 30, and substituted service was made at the
hotel on September 2, 1933. However, as the defendant subsequently proved to the
court's satisfaction, he had terminated whatever residence he might have had in
New York and returned to Virginia on August 24, 1933. On September 18, 1933,
having received timely notice of the action, the defendant appeared specially to
vacate the order for substituted service, claiming he was a resident of Virginia and
was at no time a resident of New York; his motion was denied. The Appellate
Division reversed on the ground that under the New York statute only persons
"domiciled" within the state could be served by substituted service.1 Held, the order
for substituted service must be vacated since when made, the defendant was not
"residing" within the state of New York as this term is used in the statute.2 Order
affirmed. Rawstonte v. Maguire, 265 N. Y. 204, 192 N. E. 294 (1934).
County Clerk's office under Index No. 3,722 (1928) and provides among other things that
"in the event that the defendant Hyman Dubin is necessarily obliged to pay said judgment,
then, in that event, said defendant Hyman Dubin have judgment against said defendant
Dugan Bros., Inc. for the sum of $3,162.85, and that said defendant Hyman Dubin have
execution therefor."
14. 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) § 79.
15. Order XVI A, rules 9, Rules of the Supreme Court of England (1929).
1. 240 App. Div. 1, 269 N. Y. Supp. 39 (1st Dep't 1933), the court divided three to
two. Leighty v. Tichenor, 173 App. Div. 228, 159 N. Y. Supp 457 (1st Dep't 1916),
cited in the majority opinion, is not in point since it construes the Missouri statute and
not the New York statute.
2. This note is restricted to substituted service upon natural persons under the New
York statute: N. Y.°Crv. PRAc. Acv (1921) § 230 provides for substituted service on
"a natural person residing within the state". Section 231 provides for substituted service by
(1) leaving at residence with a person of proper age, (2) if no one is found, by affixing
to door of residence and mailing to residence, (3) if no residence can be found, In such
manner as the court may direct.
The statute is only intended for two contingencies, (1) reaching runaway defendants
whose place of sojourn cannot be ascertained after proper and diligent effort, and (2)
those who remain at home in the state but avoid service of process. Nichols v. Emmett,

19351
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"The foundation of jurisdiction is physical power,"'3 so that, as the court pointed
out, there being no "residence," "domicile" nor "physical presence" within the
territorial boundaries of the state, the court in the instant case had no ground upon
which to base jurisdiction over the defendant. However, the importance of the
case is contained in the dictum,4 to the effect, that under the New York statute the
issuance of substituted service to defendants "residing" within the state is not
limited to those "domiciled" in the state, since the terms are not here used synonymously.5 Persons domiciled within a state may be served by substituted service O
even during their absence, 7 because it is said their domicile establishes a status
within the state which gives the court jurisdiction in personaim inclusive of the time
they are outside of the state. A person may have only one doaicile but he may at
56 Misc. 321, 107 N. Y. Supp. 663 (Sup. Ct. 1907); Matter of Bloss, 130 Misc. 786. 226
N. Y. Supp. 441 (Surr. Ct. 1926); Avoiding Personal Service as a Ground for Substituted
Service, N. Y. L. J., April 4, and 5, 1934, at 1602 and 1624.
3. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90, 91 (1916).
4. 265 N. Y. 205, 209, 192 N. E. 294, 296 (1934).
5. "Residence has, in many instances, been employed by judges and others to denote a
person's habitual physical presence in a place or country which may or may not be hihome." Dicay, Co-rrzcr or LAws (5th ed. 1932) 66. n. (e). "In common language, it
is not more usual than correct to say, a person resides in the city during the winter and
in the country during the summer?' (Italics not in original.) City Bank v. Merrit, 13
N. J. Law 131, 134 (Sup. Ct. 1832). RESTATmmT, CoNrLicr or LAws, (Prop. Final
Draft, 1930) § 12.
Domicile is usually said to consist of residence together with an intention to make that
place one's permanent home (anirno manendi). Matter of Newcomb, 192 N. Y. 238,
especially 250, 251, 84 N. E. 950, 954, 955 (1903). But the distinction between domicile
and residence is not uniformly observed and each statute must have its respective constiuction. For an exhaustive treatment of the subject see Ke. , RESMZc A!D
DoincLE (1934) Chap 1, in which, pp. 22-26, 100 cases holding that terms are synonymous
and 100 cases holding contra are collected. See also Meagher, Book Review (1935) 4 FoaHAir L. RLv. 161.

6. Substituted service was unknown to the common law until 5 Gzo. II c. 25 (1732);
3 BL. Coatex. --445. American courts recognize the constitutionality of such process, either
because of a state's power over its citizens, Continental Bank v. Thurber, 74 Hun. 632,
634 (N. Y. 1893), affd, 143 N. Y. 648 (1894) (defendant absent from state); Bimeler v.
Dawson, 5 IH. 536 (1843); or over those persons domiciled in the state, Henderson
v. Staniford, 105 Mlass. 504 (1870) (defendant absent from state) ; Grover & Baker Machine
Co. v. Radcliffe 137 U. S. 287 (1890) especially at 297, 298; or over those resident within the
state, see Knowles v. Gaslight & Coke Co., 86 U. S. 58, 61 (1873); Harryman v. Roberts,
52 Md. 64, 76 (1879). For the difference between state citizenship, residence, and domicile, among citizens of the United States, see Krmw, , op. cit. supra note 3, at 133-136,
351-353.
Being in derogation of the common law, the statute must be strictly construed and followed. Korn v. Lipman, 201 N. Y. 404, 94 N. E. 861 (1911).
7. Cassidy v. Leitch, 2 Abb. N. C. 315, 53 Howard Pr. 105 (N. Y. 1877); Huntley v
Baker, 33 Hun. 578 (N. Y. 1884); Continental Bank v. Thurber, 74 Hun. 632 (N. Y.
1893), aff'd, 143 N. Y. 648 (1894); Henderson v. Staniford, 105 Mass. 504 (1870); see
McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90, 91 (1916); Note L. R. A. 1917C, 1143. Contra: De la
Montanya v. De la Montanya, 112 Cal. 101, 44 Pac. 345 (1896). The view this case
takes of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877) is against the weight of authority.
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the same time have other residences, 8 and until a new domicile is acquired the old
one continues. 9 Suppose A, domiciled in state X, has also a residence in state Y.
As just indicated, state X may order substituted service on A. The dictm in the
instant case, that while A is "residing" within Y he may be served there also by
substituted service,10 is a novel ruling in New York. It is true that while A is
personally within Y he is subject to its jurisdiction, 11 but unfortunately the principal
case does not define the elements which will be required to constitute residence
under this statute when there is no domicile within the state. All that this case
makes clear is (1) that under this statute "residing" and "domicile" are not synonymous, and (2) that where there is neither presence, nor place of abode, nor domicile,
within the state there is no residence.
By analogy to other New York cases, residence (when domicile is elsewhere)
would seem to exist where an actual or usual place of abode is maintained within
the state. 12 Provided the constitutional limitations are observed 18 it would seem
8. Bennett v. Watson, 21 App. Div. 409, 47 N. Y. Supp. 569 (1st Dep't 1897);
Bischoff v. Bischoff, 88 App. Div. 126, 85 N. Y. Supp. 81 (2d Dep't 1903); but cl. Brlsen.
den v. Chamberlain, 53 Fed. 307 (C. C. S. C. 1892).
9. See Raymond v. Leishman, 243 Pa. 64, 68, 70-71, 89 Ad. 791, 792, 793 (1914);
Hunter v. Bremer, 256 Pa. 257, 262, 100 AtI. 809, 811 (1917).
New York has long held under the attachment statutes that one can be a non-resident
of the state of one's domicile. In re Thompson, 1 Wend. 43 (N. Y. 1828); Haggart v.
Morgan, 5 N. Y. 422 (1851); cf. note 3 supra.
10. Bryant v. Shute, 147 Ky. 268, especially at 272, 278, 144 S. W. 28, 31, 33 (1912);
Harrison v. Farrington, 35 N. J. Eq. 4 (Ch. 1882); Missell v. Hays, 84 N. 3. Law 196, 85
AtI. 818 (Sup. Ct. 1913); see Knowles v. Gaslight & Coke Co., 86 U. S. 58, 61, 62 (1873);
De la Montanya v. De la Montanya, 112 Cal. 101, 109, 44 Pac. 345, 346 (1896); Harryman
v. Roberts, 52 Md. 64, 76 (1879). Cf. Mudge v. Mudge, 111 Neb. 403, 196 N. W. 706
(1923); Leighty v. Tichenor, 173 App. Div. 228, 159 N. Y. Supp. 457 (1st Dep't 1916)
cited note 1, supra. (Both of the last two cases apparently turned upon a construction of
statute rather than a denial of the power of the state to have such a rule.)
11. The constitutionality of the power of a state to provide for substituted service
on mere residents seems sound. At earliest common law aliens within the state were
held to owe allegiance to the state, such allegiance being defined as follows: "Ligcantla
localis, wrought by the law; and that is when an alien that is in amity cometh into
England, because as long as he is within England, he is within the King's protection;
therefore so long as he is here, he oweth unto the King a local obedience or ligeance;
for that the one (as it bath been said) draweth the other ... Concerning the local obedience
it is observable, that as there is a local protection on the King's part, so there is a local ligeance on the subject's part." Calvin's Case, 7 Coke Rep. 1, 77 Eng. Reprints at 383, 384
(1608) ; see Co. Lire. *129a. England today recognizes the jurisdiction of foreign courts If
the defendant was a resident there at the time of the commencement of the action. Emanuel
v. Symon, [19081 1 K. B. 302 C. A.; Carrick v. Hancock, 12 T. L. R. 59 (1895) (defendant
only a temporary resident); see 6 HAIsBuRY, LAws oF ENox.A-m (2d ed. 1932) 329, 330.
For American authorities see note 10, supra.
12. "The test of'residence under attachment statute is actual place of abode, whether
temporary or permanent. A visitor ... may be employed here and work here for months
and maintain his residence in New York City . . . " Zenatello v. Pons, 235 App, Div. 221,
225, 256 N. Y. Supp. 763, 767 (1st Dep't 1932) (defendant was an alien in the country on
a renewable 6 months' permit); see General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Barnett, 142
Misc. 192, 195, 196, 254 N. Y. Supp. 166, 169, 170 (Mun. Ct. 1931). Monteiro v. St. Just
Steamship Co., Ltd., 123 Misc. 8, 204 N. Y. Supp. 3, rev'd on other grounds, 211 App, Div.
867, 207 N. Y. Supp. 224 (1st Dep't 1924),
13. Service must amount to due process. McDonald v.' Mabee, 243 U. S. 90 (1916).
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that state X (the state of domicile) has the power to order substituted service on A
by any means reasonably calculated to give him notice. 14 A's absence from the state at
the time of service will serve only as some evidence to prove that he has changed his
domicile; 15 under these circumstances New York has treated "residing" in this
statute as synonymous with "domicile,"'1 because the courts have not hesitated to
serve by substituted service defendants who have absconded from the state17 and
no doubt have every intention of giving up their abode within the state in order to
avoid service.' 8 When New York is state Y (the state of mere residence), the courts
apparently will order substituted service as long as A is "residing" (i.e., is actually
living in a place of abode) within the state. If it should subsequently appear, as in
the instant case, that A was outside of the state at the time of service,10 there is
And the jurisdiction of a court does not extend beyond its territorial boundaries. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 -U. S. 714 (1877). But a state retains jurisdiction over those domiciled
therein during their absence.
14. McDonald v. Mlabee, 243 U. S. 90 (1916); Raher v. Raher, 150 Iowa 511, 129 N. W.
494, 35 L. R. A. (N. s.) 292 (1911) (an extreme case, holding substituted service void
apparently because it was personally delivered to the defendant outfide of the state instead
of being left at his residence). Cf. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr (1921), § 231, sub. 3.
15. Hanmill v. Talbott, 72 lo. App. 22 (1897).
16. Cf. the application of the strict rule of "residence" in New Jersey where the statute
(which does not limit substituted service to "run away" defendants, cf. note 2, supra)
provides for substituted service at the "usual place of abode" of defendant, N. J. Co-p.
STAT. (1924) PRocEsS, § 163-52; and the courts have adopted a strict rule of residence not
confusable with domicile: Where several residences are maintained substituted service
cannot be effected at a closed house while defendant (domiciled in New Jersey) is away
from the state. Feighan v. Sobers, 84 N. J. Law 575, 87 AUt. 636 (Sup. Ct. 1913), af'dl
86 N. J. Law 356, 91 At. 1068 (1914). Service must be made where defendant is actually
living. lygatt v. Coe, 63 N. J. Law 510, 44 At. 19S (Sup. Ct. 1899); it cannot be made
even where flight was made to avoid service (but domicile was in New York). Swceney
v. Ainer, 88 N. J. Law 361, 95 At. 1014 (1915); but can be made on one actually
residing in New Jersey, although domiciled elsewhere. Harrison v. Farrington, 35 N. J
Eq. 4 (Ch. 1882); lissell v. Hayes, 84 N. J. Law 195, 85 At. 818 (Sup. Ct. 1913); but is
void if made upon a transient visitor. Hennings v. Cunningham, 59 Atl. 12 (N. 3. Sup.
Ct. 1904).
17. Note 7, supra.
However, New York will not recognize judgments obtained against aliens, domiciled
in New York, in the countries of which they are citizens, when jurisdiction was obtained
by constructive service. Grubel v. Nassauer, 210 N. Y. 149, 103 N. E. 1113 (1913); a
simila result was reached in Smith v. Grady, 68 Wis. 215, 31 N. W. 477 (1837).
1S. That such an illegal intent has no effect upon the status of domicile, see Matter of
Newcomb, 192 N. Y. 238, 252, 84 N. E. 950, 955 (1903).
19. The amenability of a resident to substituted Service (in the state of mere residence,
see note 9, supra) and the jurisdiction of the state over him exists as long as he is in the
state, but would seem to cease as soon as he leaves. However, there is some authority
for the view that as long as he continues to maintain a usual residence in the state
(although not domiciled there) he may be served by substituted service within the state
even during his temporary absence. Camden Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Barbour, 66
N. J. Law 103, 48 At. 1008 (Sup. Ct. 1901) (defendant lived and maintained a home, and
apparently was domiciled, in New York City; during the summer he and his family
resided in New Jersey; service by leaving process with his family in New Jersey while
defendant was temporarily absent in Europe was held valid by the New Jersey court;
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a question of fact whether, at the time of leaving the state, A intended to give up
his actual abode within the state,20 as he had a legal right to do, and the Inala fides
21
In this sense
of A in so doing cannot extend the court's jurisdiction over him.
"residing" and "domicile" are not synonymous.

WILLS-STATUTORY

RESTRICTIONS-GIFTS TO C-ARITY-BtURIAL

PLo.-Testatrx,

in her will, directed the payment of $300 to a cemetery for the perpetual care of
her burial plot. The estate was valued at approximately $12,000. Under a New
York statute' the amount that any person having a spouse, descendant or parent
may bequeath to charity is limited to one-half the value of the estate, after the
payment of debts. If the direction in the will were held to be a bequest to charity,
the total amount so bequeathed would exceed the statutory limitation. Held, that
such a bequest is properly classifiable as a funeral expense and not as a charitable
gift. Matter of Miranda's Will, 271 N. Y. Supp. 913 (Surr. Ct. 1934).
Funeral expenses have long been recognized as initial claims against a decedent's
estate.2 Frequently it becomes important to determine whether a bequest for the
maintenance of a burial plot is to be considered as a funeral expense having priority
over other bequests, or is to be deemed a charitable gift and consequently subject
to statutory limitations restricting the amount of charitable bequests.
It has generally been held, that in the absence of statutory provision such a
bequest is not a charitable one and is therefore void for repugnancy to the rule
against perpetuities. 3 New York, however, has validated such a devise or bequest
apparently defendant did not raise the question that New Jersey could not exercise Jurisdiction over him since he was outside of the state); see Missell v. Hayes, 84 N, J. Law
196, 198, 85 AtI. 818, 819 (1913). Cf. RESTATFMENT, Com'Lic" OF LAWS (Prop. Final
Draft, 1930) § 83 Comment (d) Illus. 2, which treats substituted service upon a mere
resident during his absence from the state as incomplete, but upon his return to the state
jurisdiction is then obtained. It would seem sounder to settle the question of jurisdiction
at the date of the substituted service within the state. However, the forthcoming Restatement has omitted Comment (d) ibid. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 78
(formerly § 83).
20. This specific point is the problem involved in Sweeny v. Miner, 88 N. J. Law 361,
95 AtI. 1014 (Sup. Ct. 1915).
21. It is highly questionable whether a state has the power to issue process against an
absent resident (who is not domiciled in the state). The instant case deciding as It does
that defendant was not a "resident" within the statute and stressing the fact that he had given
up his abode, rather than only pointing out that he was not physically present In the state
at the time of service, suggests the question whether New York will regard a defendait as
"residing" within the statute when he maintains an actual abode within the state irrespective
of presence. As a practical matter, in New York where substituted service is only Isued
against "runaway" 'defendants (see note 2, supra) any mere resident who flees to avoid
service will undoubtedly intend to terminate his abode within the state and so, like the
defendant in the instant case, will not be amenable to substituted service. As pointed out
in the principal case, a defendant has a right to change his place of abode at any time;
cf. note 16, supra, with respect to change of domicile.
1. N. Y. DEc. EST. LAw (1909)

§ 17.
2. Patterson v. Patterson, 59 N. Y. 574 (1874); Matter of Stiles, 126 Misc. 715, 215
N. Y. Supp, 134 (Surr. Ct. 1926); N. Y. SuRR. CT. AcT (1920) § 216.
3. Bates v. Bates, 134 Mass. 110 (1883); Matter of Waldron, 57 Misc. 275, 109 N. Y.
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by provisions of the Real and Personal Property Laws which characterize such
dispositions as charitable uses. 4
The leading case on the construction of these statutes is Matter of Braasch.6 In
that case a bequest for the maintenance of the testatrix's burial plot ,as held to
be a bequest for a charitable use, and therefore within the statutory limitation on
such gifts. Numerous other decisions have followed and strengthened this interpretation. 6
Apparently in direct conflict with the provisions of the New York Real and
Personal Property Laws is the New York Surrogate's Court Act.7 This statute
expressly classifies bequests for the upkeep of decedent's burial plot as a necessary
part of his funeral expense. The leading case construing this Act is Matter of
Opdyke's Will,8 in which such a bequest was held to be a funeral expense and not
a charitable use. Support for this view may also be found in the law of taxation
where it has repeatedly been held that a fund for the maintenance of the testators
burial plot is a part of the burial expense, and therefore not subject to a transfer
tax.9 In one case this statute was construed to allow the disposition of a reasonable
amount for the erection of a tombstone over the decedent's grave. 0 Finally it
has been extended to include the erection of a mausoleum for the interment of
the testator's remains."
Supp. 681 (Surr. Ct. 1907); Mcflvain v. Hockaday, 36 Te.. Civ. App. 1, 81 S. W. 54
(1904); see Kelly v. Nichols, 17 R. 1. 306, 317 (1S92); PEnmr, TRusTs &NO ThusTrzs
(7th ed. 1929) 1198; 1 J.ARm , WmLts (6th Am. ed. 1893) 203 (stating same rule in
respect to trust funds for care of vaults and tombs). See Note (1919) 4 A. L. R. 1124,
1127, for enumeration of jurisdictions having statutory provisions permitting such bequests.
4. "Trust for Care of Cemetery Lots etc.-Gifts, grants and bequests of personal
property, in trust for the purpose of perpetual care, and maintenance, improvement or
embellishment of cemeteries or private burial lots, . . . are permitted, and shall be
deemed to be for charitable and benevolent uses." N. Y. Pins. Pnop. L,,w (1909) § 13a.
N. Y. r.u PROP. LAW (1909) § 114a is the same as the N. Y. Pins. Pnop. L m, (1909)
§ 13a, supra, except that it substitutes "devises of real property" for "bequests of pasonal
property."
5. 206 App. Div. 96, 200 N. Y. Supp. 404 (2d Dep't 1923).
6. Matter of Beck, 130 Misc. 765, 225 N. Y. Supp. 187 (Surf. Ct. 1927), (holding
that masses to be said for the decedent constitute a charitable use); Matter of Fellion's
Estate, 132 Misc. 805, 231 N. Y. Supp. 9 (Surr. Ct. 1928); Matter of Blasius' will, 134
Misc. 753, 236 N. Y. Supp. 388 (Surr. Ct. 1929); Matter of Johnson, 148 Miec. 218,
265 N. Y. Supp. 395 (Surf. Ct. 1933). Further cases holding that marses to be said for
the decedent are a charitable use are Matter of Morris, 227 N. Y. 141, 124 N. E. 724
(1919); Webster v. Sughrow, 69 N. H. 380, 45 At. 139 (1898); cf. Driscoll v. Hewlitt,
198 N. Y. 297, 91 N. E. 784 (1910).
7. "The expression 'funeral expenses' includes suitable church or other services, a burial
lot, suitable monumental work thereon, and a reasonable charge or expenditure for the
perpetual care of decedent's burial lot." N. Y. Sum. CT. Acr (1920) § 314 (3).
8. 230 App. Div. 290, 243 N. Y. Supp. 606 (4th Dep't 1930), modified 255 N. Y. 255,
174 N. E. 646 (1931).
9. Matter of Vinot, 7 N. Y. Supp. 517 (Surr. Ct. 1889); Matter of Maverick, 135

App. Div. 44, 119 N. Y. Supp. 914 (1st Dep't 1909); Matter of Delafield, 142 Misc. 36,
255 N. Y. Supp. 85 (Surf. Ct. 1932).
10. Matter of Howard's Estate, 3 Misc. 170, 23 N. Y. Supp. 836 (Surr. Ct. 1893).
11. Matter of Billman, 143 Misc. 765, 257 N. Y. Supp. 491 (Surr. CL 1932).
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12
Similar to these cases in theory, but differing in result is a recent case wherein
a trust provision had set aside $200 for the care and maintenance of the testator's
plot and for the improvement of the cemetery generally. In recognizing the conflict
the court intimated that if the bequest had been limited to the testator's plot, or
if a division of the bequest so as to determine the amount intended for that pur10
pose had been feasible, 1it4 would have held it to be a "funeral expense," the statutes
used
be
to
and Matter of Braasch notwithstanding, and only that part that was
for the cemetery at large, to be charity. Moreover, when the bequest is for the
maintenance of a burial plot which is not to be used solely for the interment of
the decedent, the courts are loath to go contrary to the New York Personal Property
Law. 15 Thus a bequest of $1,000 for the upkeep of a burial plot where the decedent
expense" because there were six
was to be interred, was held not to be a "funeral
other graves in the plot besides the decedent's. 10
There is in addition a third line of cases which attempt to reconcile both the
New York Personal Property Law and the New York Surrogate's Court Act, although
the majority of cases follow one or the other of these statutes exclusively and refuse
to meet the conflict. The cases of this third group follow a doctrine which depends
entirely on the reasonableness of the bequest. They hold such bequests to be "funeral
expenses," in accordance with the New York Surrogate's Court Act, up to a "reason-7
able amount" only, and any bequest above this "reasonable amount" to be charity.'
the size of the estate, and
This "reasonable amount" is to be determined (1) by
(2) by the means and station in life of the deceased.' 8 Thus a bequest of $13,300
for a mausoleum, and $4,000 for a burial plot has been held "reasonable," and
therefore a "funeral expense," where the total estate was $150,000;19 but a bequest
of the testator's entire estate, except a small portion thereof, for masses and for
of his burial plot, was held to be "unreasonable" and hence a
the maintenance
20
charitable use.
These cases would seem to represent the sounder view. It is logical that a
reasonable amount should be set aside for the maintenance of a fitting resting place
for the decedent, and this sum should be regarded as a necessary part of his burial
expense, entitled to priority over other bequests. This, obviously, is the legislative intention manifested in the New York Surrogate's Court Act. But when the
sum set aside for such burial plot and its maintenance exceeds the bounds of a
reasonable amount, the reason underlying the argument ceases to exist, In such a

12. Matter of Mawhinney, 146 Misc. 30, 261 N. Y. Supp. 334 (Surr. Ct. 1932), aft'd,
239 App. Div. 874, 264 N. Y. Supp. 984 (3d Dep't 1933).
13. N. Y. Pnis. PRop. LAW (1909) § 13a, N. Y. REAL Pao,. LAw (1909) § 114a, cited
note 4, supra.
14. 206 App. Div. 96, 200 N. Y. Supp. 404 (2d Dep't 1923).
15. Matter of McArdle's Will, 147 Misc. 876, 264 N. Y. Supp. 764 (Surr. Ct. 1933);
Matter of Gavey's Estate, 147 Misc. 332, 263 N. Y. Supp. 784 (Surr. Ct. 1933).
16. Ibid.
17. Matter of McArdle's Will, 147 Misc. 876, 264 N. Y. Supp. 764 (Surr. Ct. 1933)"
Matter of Delafield, 142 Misc. 536, 255 N. Y. Supp. 85 (Surr. Ct. 1932) (bequest of

$3,000 for a burial plot held reasonable, the total estate being $2,000,000); Matter of
Myers, 140 Misc. 442, 250 N. Y. Supp. 660 (Surr. Ct. 1931) (bequest of $3,000 for the
same purpose again held reasonable, the total estate being $160,000); Matter of Brewster,
144 Misc. 888, 260 N. Y. Supp. 588 (Surr. Ct.
18. Matter of Smallman's Will, 138 Misc. 889,
19. Matter of Billman, 143 Misc. 765, 257 N.
20. Matter of Beck, 130 Misc. 765, 225 N. Y.

1932).
247 N. Y. Supp. 593 (Surr. Ct. 1931).
Y. Supp. 491 (Surr. Ct. 1932).
Supp. 187 (Surr. Ct. 1927).
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situation the New York Personal Property Law should be followed in order to
prevent decedents' estates from being consumed by a gift of a quasi-charitable
character under the guise of a funeral expense.

WonxAsN's COMPENSATION-OccuPATIONAL DrSEAS.-The plaintiff contracted
"pulmonary asbestosis"' during the course of his employment in the defendant's
asbestos plant, thereby becoming disabled. He brought a common law action for
damages, alleging the defendant's negligence. On appeal from a judgment sustaining
the defendant's motion for a non-suit, held, that since the injury was not an occupational disease, but an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment, the sole remedy was under the compensation law.2 Judgment affirmed. One
judge dissented. McNeely v.CarolinaAsbestos Plant, 206 N. C. 568, 174 S, E. 509

(1934).
This decision furnishes further evidence of the endeavors of the courts to hold
all employee injuries, sustained in the course of employment, compensable under
the compensation laws. The trend is commendable, sociologically speaking, though in
the instant case the most lucrative remedial channel was probably closed to the
plaintiff. Rigid adherence to the principle of stare deciss, however, has prevented
the courts from carrying their views to a logical and equitable conclusion.
The phrase "injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment,"
defining the statutory prerequisite to recovery, is found in the laws of twenty-four3
of the forty-four states wherein compensation laws are in force. It was taken from
the original English Workmen's Compensation Law of 1897, 4 and was at first,
following the decision in Steel v. Cammell Laird & Co.,5 interpreted rigidly to mean
an unexpected injury traceable to a particular occurrence at a specific time and place.
Such an interpretation was in large part due to the requirement, still necessary, that
the employer be notified of the injury. As occupational diseases are of gradual
contraction and due wholly to causes and conditions which are normal and constantly present and characteristic of a particular occupation,0 they were excluded
from compensation benefits. As a result, if an injury is now termed an occupational
1. Pulmonary asbestosis is a lung disease caused by the inhalation of asbestos dust.
2. N. C. CODE Asmm. (Michie, 1931) § S031 (r) vitiates all other remedies where compenation is available under the compensation law.
3. ALA. CODE (1923) § 7534; AnRz. REv. CoDn Amz. (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 1421; CoL.
Comn. ST.r. (1921) § 4389; Del. Laws 1917, c. 233 § 3193 d; GA. CODE Am. (Parl, Supp.
1922) § 3154 d; IDAHO CODE AIM. (1932) § 43-1001; hIm. STAT. Amnr. (Burms, Supp. 1929)
§ 9447; KAN. Rv.STAT. Aam. (Supp. 1933) § 44-501; Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) § 4850;
LA. Gm,. STAT. (Dart, 1932) § 4392; Mn. Rnv. STAT. (1930) c 55 § 8; Mn '.STAT.
(Mason, 1927) § 4269; Mo. Rav. STAT. (1929) § 3301; NED. ComP. STAT. (1929) § 48-109;
Nay. Comp. LAws (Hlillyer, 1929) § 26S0; N. 1. Laws 1911, c. 95 § 7; N. At. STIT. Am.
(Courtright, 1929) § 156-102, as amended by N. M. Laws 1933, c. 178; N. C. PuB. Laws
(1929), c. 120 § 4; ORE. CoDE 2s. (1930) §§ 49-1814, 49-1827; R. I. Gra. Lws (1923)
§ 1212; S. D. Comp. LAws (1929)

§ 9437; Tr--m.

CODE (Will

Shan. & Harlow, 1932)

§ 6853; VT. Pun. LAws (1933) § 6504; VA. CODE A?,r. (Michie, 1930) § 1857 (4).
4. 60 & 61 Vicr. c. 37 § 1 (1897). See also Bohlen, A Problem in the Drafthng of
Workmnen's Compensation Acts (1912) 25 H1ARv. L. Rav. 328, 329.

2 K. B. 232; Eke v. Hart-Dyke, [1910] 2 K. B. 677.

5.

[1905]

6.

Seattle Can Co. v. Dept. of Labor and Ind. of Wash., 147 Wash. 303, 265 Pac.

739

(1928).
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disease it is perforce excluded by the courts of those states wherein the laws,1 or
the interpretation placed on them,8 excludes all diseases not traceable to an injury by
accident. A cursory examination might suggest that the rule of exclusion should
have been applied to the case under review. However, as the injury could have
been prevented by the use of due care, it was not an occupational disease. Accord.
ingly, the court, following well reasoned decisions in other states,0 adopted the
theory that an injury by accident could be of gradual contraction, and thus, after
finding that the employer's negligence rendered its contraction unexpected, hold the
plaintiff's injury compensable. This conclusion seems both fair and reasonable, for
as Mr. Justice Cardozo has aptly said,10 "We make little progress when, viewing
infection as an isolated concept and ignoring its channels of attack or the manner of
its coming, we say, upon the authority of science, that infection is a disease. It
may be this, and yet be an accident too." However, to hold this disease an un7. The following state laws definitely exclude all diseases not attributable to an Injury
by accident: ALA. CODE (1923) § 7596 (j); ARiz. CODE (1928) § 1420; Del. Laws 1917, c.
233 § 3193ss (c); GA. CODE AxN. (Park, Supp. 1922) § 3154 b (d); IDAO CoOn ANN.
(1932) § 43-1810; IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, Supp. 1929) § 9518 (d); LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart.,
1932) § 4427; Nn. ComP. STAT. (1929) § 48-152; MD.ANt. CODE (Bagby, 1924) Art. 101
§ 65 (6); N. C. Pus. LAws (1929) c. 120 § 2 (f); OxaA. STAT. AmN. (Harlow, 1931)
§ 13350 (7); S. D. Cowx,. LAws (1929) § 9490; TENN. CODE (Will. Shan. & Harlow, 1932)
§ 6852 (d); UTAH Rv. STAT. ANN. (1933) § 42-1-42 (5); VT. PuB. LAWs (1933) § 6485
(4); VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1930) § 1887 (2d); MoNT. RE:v. CODn (Choate, 1921) §
2870 (states that "injury refers only to an injury resulting from some fortuitous event, as
distinguished from the contraction of disease." Injury is interpreted to mean an In.
dustrial accident. Kerns v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 87 Mont. 546, 289 Pac. $63
[19301); Wyo. REv. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1931) §§ 124-106, 124-107 (1) (excludes
all diseases not due to an injury, which it is indicated means an injury by accident.
Fowler v. Continental Oil Co., 43 Wyo. 410, 4 P. (2d) 1092 [1931]; McMahon v. Midwest
Refining Co., 36 Wyo. 90, 252 Pac. 1027 [1927]).
8. The courts of the following states interpret their laws to exclude all diseases not
attributable to an injury by accident: United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Industrial
Comm. of Colo., 76 Colo. 241, 230 Pac. 624 (1924); Chop v. Swift & Co., 118 Kan. 35,
233 Pac. 800 (1925); Dillingham's Case, 127 Me. 245, 142 At. 865 (1928); Adams v.
Acme White Lead & Color Works, 182 Mich. 157, 148 N. W. 485 (1914); Thomson v.
Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 86 N. H. 436, 170 At]. 769 (1934); Iwanicki v. State Industrial Ace.
Comm., 104 Ore. 650, 205 Pac. 990 (1922); Mills v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 107 Pa.
Super. Ct. 432, 164 Atl. 69 (1933); Keith v. Narragansett Electric Co., 53 R. I. 160, 164
Atl. 907 (1933); Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Barron, 21 S.-W. (2d) 78 (Tex. Civ. App.
1929) rev'd on other grounds, 36 S. W. (2d) 46 (1931); Pellerin v, Washington Veneer
Co., 163 Wash. 555, 2 P. (2d) 658 (1931); Jones v. Rinehart & Dennis Co., Inc., 113 W.
Va. 414, 168 S. E. 482 (1933).
9. Ramsay v. Sullivan Mining Co., 51 Idaho 366, 6 P. (2d) 856 (1931); Riggs v. Ash
Grove Lime & Portland Cement Co., 131 Kan. 244, 289 Pac. 410 (1930); Victory Sparkler
& Specialty Co. v. Francks, 147 Md. 368, 128 Ad. 635 (1925); Dove v. Alpena Hide &
Leather Co., 198 Mich. 132, 164 N. W. 253 (1917); Johnson Oil Rtfining Co. v. Guthrie,
167 Okla. 83, 27 P. (2d) 814 (1933); Cf. Wilson & Co. v. McGee, 163 Okla. 99, 21 P.
(2d) 25 (1933). Dondeneau v. State Industrial Ace. Comm., 119 Ore. 357, 249 Pac. 820
(1926); Huntley v. Oregon State Industrial Acc. Comm., 138 Ore. 184, 6 P. (2d) 209
(1931).
10. Connelly v. Hunt Furniture Co., 240 N. Y. 83, 87, 147 N. E. 366, 367 (1925),
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expected injury, thus one by accident, and yet exclude many, if not all, occupational
-diseases, taxes the mind with fine subtleties of reasoning not at all in harmony with
the fundamental principles of workmen's compensation laws, which call for recompense for employees disabled in their work irrespective of the question of negligence
or assumption of risk. The contraction of an occupational disease is just as unexpected to the average laboring man, working at an occupation wherein occupational
diseases are prevalent, as was the disease contraction to the plaintiff here. In the
one case the possibilities of contracting disease should be known before the employment is entered; in the other, after a few days work has been done in the dustladen atmosphere. In either instance, it is highly probable that little thought was
given the subject. A number of states have recognized the unfairness of excluding
occupational diseases and have made provision therefor. Connecticut
allows com-4
3
pensation for occupational diseases;" California, ' North Dakotal and Wisconsin
allow compensation for any disease growing out of, or proximately caused by, employment; six other states enumerate specific occupational diseases for which compensation is granted; 15 the Massachusetts courts interpret the statute of that state to
include most diseases of an occupational nature;'
and Missouri
provides that
occupational diseases may, by joint agreement of employer and employee, be brought
under the compensation law. It is submitted that the legislatures of the various
other states should rescue their respective courts from the dilemma into which the
occupational disease question has plunged them, preferably by providing compensation for all diseases incurred in the course of and by reason of one's employment.
11. Coa,_z€. Gea. STAT. (1930) § 5223 (provides for occupational disease, defined to
mean a disease peculiar to the occupation and due to causes in excess of the ordinary
hazards of employment as such); Rousu v. Collins Co., 114 Conn. 24, 157 AU. 264 (1931);
Jadovich v. Collins Co., 109 Conn. 62, 145 At. 25 (1929).
12. CaL. Gmi. LAws (Deering, 1931) Act 4749, §§ 3 (4), 6.
13. N. D. CoNT. LAWS ANx. (Supp. 1925) § 396 a 2; Brown v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 55 N. D. 491, 214 N. W. 622 (1927).

14. Wis. STAT. (1933) §§ 102.01, 102.03; Kimlark Rug Corp. v. Stansfield, 210 Wis. 319,
246 N. W. 424 (1933).

15. I.L. REv. STAT. (Smith & Hurd, 1931) c. 48 §§ 87, 74, 73; Ky. STAT. (Carroll,
1930) § 4880 (Ky. Acts 1934, c. 89, makes possible compensation for certain other occupational diseases by joint agreement of employer and employee); Mrn.. STAT. (Aason,
1927) § 4327; N. J. Laws 1926, c. 31; N. Y. WoRxmm's CoixmsiazoSr

LAW (1922)

§ 3

(2), as amended by Laws 1934, c. 743, in effect Sept. 1, 1934; Omo G=.. CoDE (Page,
1931) § 1465-6Sa.

16. Sullivan's Case, 265 Mass. 497, 164 N. E. 457 (1929); Johnson's Case, 279 Mass.
481, 181 N. E. 761 (1932); cf. Moses Pimental's Case, 235 Mass. 598, 127 N. E. 424 (1920).
17. Mo. Rv. STAT. (1929) § 3305 (b), as amended by Mo. Laws 1931 H. B. No. 498.

